The Moscow envoys and the fog of dealmaking

Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Trump’s senior envoys, met Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin on Saturday, footage confirming the encounter that multiple outlets had anticipated. The visit arrives just days after Russia struck Ukraine’s security headquarters in Kyiv with a drone, the most brazen attack on the Ukrainian capital’s intelligence infrastructure since the full-scale invasion began. According to NPR’s reporting, the envoys are in Moscow to “revive efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine,” though no agenda or framework has been publicly confirmed. The juxtaposition — American diplomats in the Kremlin even as Russian drones reduce Ukrainian government buildings to rubble — captures the essential tension in Washington’s current approach to the conflict.

The received wisdom

The mainstream reading of this mission is, broadly, hopeful. The argument runs that only the United States has the leverage to bring Russia to the table, and that Trump’s transactional style, whatever its coarseness, may finally produce the diplomatic breakthrough that the Biden-era policy of “as long as it takes” never did. Witkoff and Kushner are not ideologues; they are dealmakers whose record in the Gulf suggests they can operate in environments where traditional diplomats feel squeamish. If Putin is willing to talk — and his welcoming of the delegation suggests at least a minimal openness — then perhaps the logic of exhaustion has finally overtaken the logic of maximalism on both sides. Ukraine is grinding, Russia is bleeding economically, and an imperfect peace, the argument goes, is better than the indefinite continuation of a war that has already killed hundreds of thousands.

There is something to this. Wars end not when justice is done but when both parties calculate that more fighting costs more than the achievable outcome is worth. The United States has historically been a necessary catalyst for exactly these calculations — from Dayton to Camp David. The skeptics of engagement, this view suggests, are letting the perfect be the enemy of the achievable.

A different read

The problem is that the timing doesn’t just happen to be awkward — it is structurally revealing. The Kremlin’s decision to strike Ukraine’s security headquarters days before welcoming American peace envoys is not incidental. It is a signal, consistent with how Putin has behaved throughout this conflict: maximise military pressure to improve the negotiating position, and let Western engagement do the work of freezing gains in place. Russia’s ongoing hybrid campaign against European infrastructure — attributed by Germany to Russian sabotage at Leipzig airport — tells the same story. Moscow is not moderating its behaviour as a gesture of good faith. It is intensifying it.

This has a precedent that should weigh on any historically literate observer. In 1973, Henry Kissinger negotiated the Paris Peace Accords with North Vietnam while Hanoi was actively violating the ceasefire in place — a deal that produced a two-year pause before the final collapse of the South Vietnamese state. The lesson was not that diplomacy was wrong, but that diplomacy divorced from enforcement mechanisms and credible deterrence produces agreements the stronger party simply ignores when convenient. Al Jazeera’s reporting notes that the envoys met Putin “for talks on Ukraine,” but the absence of any Ukrainian delegation in Moscow is itself a detail worth dwelling on. A peace process that runs through the aggressor’s capital, with the victim nation absent, is not a negotiation — it is a dictation dressed in diplomatic clothing.

The deeper structural problem is that transactional diplomacy rewards the party that is willing to be most disruptive. Putin’s leverage in this conversation comes almost entirely from his demonstrated willingness to keep fighting and to use indiscriminate force. Every concession extracted by the threat of continued violence sets the price of the next transaction. This is, of course, the logic that critics of appeasement have invoked since at least Munich — a comparison that is frequently overused but is not entirely inapt when the party being accommodated has a consistent track record of treating concessions as invitations to demand more.

None of this means the Witkoff-Kushner mission is doomed or that diplomacy should not be attempted. Exhaustion is a real phenomenon in warfare, and there are moments when even an imperfect deal can save lives. The more serious question is whether Washington is prepared to condition any agreement on verifiable enforcement — and whether it has the patience to walk away if Putin treats the envoys’ visit as merely another instrument for consolidating territorial gains. A deal that freezes the current lines of control without security guarantees for Ukraine, without a path to Russian accountability, and without a credible Western deterrent against future aggression is not a peace. It is a postponement.

What to watch

Four signals will tell us whether this is genuine diplomacy or theatre. First, whether Ukraine is brought into the process as a principal rather than a peripheral — Kyiv’s exclusion from the Moscow talks is a red flag. Second, whether Putin halts or reduces offensive operations as a confidence-building measure; the drone strike on the SBU was not the action of a leader who intends to make concessions. Third, whether the Trump administration signals a willingness to maintain or increase military assistance to Ukraine as negotiating leverage, or instead uses talks as political cover for drawing down support. Fourth, watch European reaction: if Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw are not aligned on whatever framework emerges, the diplomatic scaffolding will not hold.

— J