Germany's AfD bids for its first taste of real power

Germany’s far-right Alternative für Deutschland party is bidding for an outright majority in Saxony-Anhalt’s state election, which would mark the first time a far-right party has held state-level executive power in Germany since the Second World War. The BBC’s reporting notes that other parties have maintained a cordon sanitaire, refusing to govern with the AfD — but if the party wins outright, that cordon becomes irrelevant. Germany’s domestic intelligence service (Verfassungsschutz) has classified parts of the AfD as “confirmed extremist,” a designation that creates legal complications for coalition membership but does not prevent electoral victories. The AfD’s support in eastern German states has been consistently higher than in the west, reflecting both economic grievances and a distinct political culture shaped by forty years of communist governance and a reunification experience widely regarded in the east as a form of colonisation by the prosperous west.

The received wisdom

The liberal and centre-left framing of the AfD’s rise is by now highly developed and internally consistent: the party peddles xenophobia and nostalgia, exploits legitimate economic anxieties to advance an ethnonationalist agenda, and its rise reflects the failure of democratic institutions to deliver prosperity and dignity to eastern German communities left behind by the post-reunification economic model. This reading concludes that the appropriate response is a combination of economic investment in the east, firm legal constraints on the AfD’s more extreme activities, and continued refusal to normalise the party through coalition partnership. It also draws heavy lines to Weimar-era analogies, warning that the normalisation of far-right parties erodes the democratic immune system, especially in a country with Germany’s specific historical burden.

This reading deserves respect. The Weimar analogy is not frivolous. Germany’s institutional architects in 1949 were deliberately designing against the failures that enabled National Socialism, and those institutions have largely held for seventy-five years. The cordon sanitaire has served a purpose.

A different read

And yet. The cordon sanitaire’s logic depends on a crucial assumption: that keeping the AfD out of power prevents its voter base from growing. The evidence of the past decade across Europe suggests the opposite. In every case where mainstream parties have refused engagement with the underlying anxieties driving populist support — and instead focused on delegitimising the populists themselves — the populist vote has grown. France’s repeated cordon around Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National has produced a party that, in successive elections, has come agonisingly close to the Élysée. Italy’s refusal to engage seriously with Giorgia Meloni’s FdI produced a governing prime minister. The UK’s contempt for UKIP and then Reform UK has produced, according to multiple polls, a Reform UK that briefly topped national polling and forced the Conservative party into a painful identity crisis.

The deeper problem in eastern Germany is one that neither the CDU nor the SPD nor the Greens has been willing to confront honestly: the reunification settlement was lopsided in ways that created lasting resentments. West German capital absorbed east German industry, closed what it considered unviable, and transferred social benefits — but the management class, the cultural institutions, and the media remained dominated by westerners. The result is a region that has improved dramatically in material terms but that has never felt genuinely heard within German democratic institutions. The AfD’s support is partly xenophobic, but dismissing it entirely as xenophobia is itself a form of condescension that accelerates the very alienation it claims to deplore.

The right-leaning case for taking eastern German populism seriously is not that the AfD’s more extreme positions deserve validation. It is that the underlying critique — economic neglect, cultural dismissal, a political class that governs for an imagined cosmopolitan centre — is substantially correct and deserves a serious response from mainstream conservatism rather than a coalition of the establishment united in mutual alarm. The CDU’s failure to offer that response has ceded the field. Friedrich Merz’s recent attempts to harden CDU immigration rhetoric have largely been read, correctly, as reactive rather than principled.

If the AfD wins Saxony-Anhalt, the consequences for German federal politics will be significant regardless of how the other parties respond. An outright majority would force the question: does the cordon hold when it means leaving a democratically elected state government unable to function? And if mainstream parties seek to govern alongside the AfD after years of refusing to, what does that signal to every other European populist party about the ultimate costs of the cordon strategy?

What to watch

  • The Saxony-Anhalt election result itself — whether the AfD achieves outright majority or falls short and forces coalition negotiations.
  • Federal CDU reaction: whether Merz uses a potential AfD majority to justify further rightward movement on migration, or doubles down on the cordon.
  • European-level implications: a governing AfD in Saxony-Anhalt would be cited immediately by Viktor Orbán, the RN, and other European right-populists as legitimising precedent.
  • German Verfassungsschutz’s response — if the AfD achieves executive power in a state, the legal questions around its “extremist” designation will immediately become acute.

— J