Germany held a state election in Saxony-Anhalt on Sunday, and the results confirmed what exit polls had forecast: the far-right Alternative für Deutschland won roughly 44 percent of the vote — more than double its previous share — leaving the Christian Democrats of Chancellor Friedrich Merz a distant second. The AfD has now positioned itself as the largest party in a German state legislature for the first time in the postwar era. Whether it can actually form a government remains uncertain: every mainstream party continues to refuse coalition or any formal cooperation with the AfD, a stance known as the Brandmauer (firewall). The result has triggered an immediate political crisis over whether that firewall is sustainable, and what it costs Eastern German voters to have their preferences systematically locked out of executive power.
The received wisdom
The standard interpretation, offered reflexively by centrist commentators across Europe and echoed by alarmed editorials from Berlin to Brussels, is that the AfD’s rise is fundamentally an expression of grievance rather than genuine political conviction. The party, on this reading, is a protest vehicle powered by anxieties about immigration, economic dislocation in the former East, and a diffuse cultural resentment of metropolitan liberal elites. The appropriate response, most establishment voices insist, is to refrain from legitimising the AfD by engaging its platform, hold the Brandmauer firm, and invest in better public services and more empathetic messaging. The AfD, it is argued, would wither if mainstream parties simply addressed the underlying needs driving its support. On this account, forming any government that involves the AfD would be a catastrophic capitulation to the forces of democratic backsliding, risking the kind of authoritarian drift seen in Hungary under Viktor Orbán.
A different read
The received wisdom is not wrong in its diagnosis of grievance, but it is wrong about the cure — and it is becoming dangerously detached from political reality.
Start with the democratic legitimacy problem. Saxony-Anhalt has a population of roughly 2.2 million people. On Sunday’s projections, the AfD secured the votes of approaching half the electorate. Germany’s system of proportional representation was designed precisely to ensure that sizable political minorities receive representation proportionate to their support. When every other party in a legislature agrees in advance to exclude the largest party from governance regardless of the result, the system is no longer functioning as designed. The voters of Saxony-Anhalt are not being protected from authoritarianism; they are being told their votes do not count. That is itself a democratic pathology, and it is one the establishment created.
Second, consider the historical parallel. The Brandmauer strategy mirrors the cordon sanitaire applied to Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party in Austria in the 1990s and to various populist parties across Europe since. The record is not encouraging. Exclusion rarely deflates populist movements; it frequently radicalises them and their supporters, confirming the core narrative that the system is rigged. When the mainstream eventually did engage with Haider — and when the Austrian People’s Party eventually formed a coalition with the FPÖ — the sky did not fall. Austria remained a constitutional democracy. The lesson is that isolation tends to preserve and amplify populist energy rather than dissipate it.
Third, the AfD’s 44 percent is not principally a vote for the party’s more extreme positions on Russia or historical memory. Exit poll data consistently shows that AfD voters in the East vote primarily on immigration, economic security, and a sense of being dismissed by political elites in Berlin and Brussels — not on neo-Nazi nostalgia or admiration for Vladimir Putin. Conflating the entire voter base with the party’s most objectionable fringe is both analytically lazy and politically counterproductive. It also, conveniently, allows the mainstream to avoid examining what its own governance has failed to deliver in the East across three decades since reunification.
Friedrich Merz’s CDU, which positioned itself as a tough alternative on migration before the last federal election, has made modest progress on the issue but has not reversed the popular sense that Germany’s asylum and migration system remains chaotic. The coalition agreement in Berlin continues to prioritise climate transition and industrial policy for the West. Per capita public investment in Saxony-Anhalt remains below the national average. These are structural grievances, not merely rhetorical ones, and the Brandmauer does nothing to address them.
There is a serious argument that some AfD figures — particularly on the national level — hold views incompatible with constitutional democracy. That argument deserves honest engagement, not use as a blanket justification for disenfranchising nearly half of an electorate. The Constitutional Court’s monitoring of the party, still ongoing, is the proper legal mechanism for that determination. In the meantime, treating forty-four percent of Saxony-Anhalters as political lepers is not a democratic strategy. It is a recipe for the resentment to deepen.
What to watch
- Whether any CDU state politician breaks ranks and opens exploratory talks with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, triggering a national crisis in Merz’s coalition.
- Whether the federal Constitutional Court’s ongoing review of the AfD’s status produces any formal restriction — and whether that inflames or deflates support.
- How the European Parliament’s mainstream groupings respond: the Brandmauer logic is under pressure in multiple member states simultaneously, including France and the Netherlands.
- Whether Saxony-Anhalt goes to a second election or a minority government emerges — both scenarios would accelerate the crisis for Germany’s mainstream parties.
— J