AfD demands power, and Germany's firewall cracks

Germany woke on Monday to a political morning-after unlike any since reunification. The Alternative for Germany party, having captured 43.8 percent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt’s state election, emerged three seats short of an outright majority in the 83-seat state parliament. By dawn, AfD deputy parliamentary leader Beatrix von Storch was before television cameras delivering a line that will echo through German politics for months: “You cannot say, I do not accept the vote of the people.” The party’s state leader, Ulrich Siegmund, declared a “clear mandate to govern” and said discussions with potential coalition partners had begun Sunday night. Chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose CDU saw its share of the Saxony-Anhalt vote nearly halved to 17.2 percent, called the result “seismic — not just in the country but also in my own political party.”

The received wisdom

The consensus reaction to the AfD’s Saxony-Anhalt result runs roughly as follows: an alarming lurch toward extremism that Germany’s democratic institutions must resist. The domestic intelligence service, the Verfassungsschutz, classifies the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt as “right-wing extremist”, a designation the party contests. Most mainstream parties have maintained a so-called “firewall” — a commitment never to enter coalition with the AfD — precisely because they regard it as incompatible with the postwar democratic order. The fear is straightforward: a party that openly advocates “remigration,” that has drawn warm praise from the Kremlin, and that questions Germany’s World War Two accountability framework, gaining control over state-level policing and education would represent a historic regression. No far-right party has governed a German state since 1945. That taboo, the argument goes, must hold.

This reading is not without substance. The AfD’s policy platform for Saxony-Anhalt includes segregating child refugees into separate classes and establishing a deportation task force. These are not minor policy differences. The party exists in a different moral register from normal centre-right conservatism, and anyone who says otherwise is not engaging honestly with its programme.

A different read

And yet the firewall, however principled in origin, has become a political instrument of self-preservation for parties that have spent thirty years ignoring the legitimate grievances underpinning the AfD’s support. The CDU at 17.2 percent in Saxony-Anhalt is not just a victim of extremism — it is a party that has failed to govern competently, failed to address economic stagnation in the former East, and spent the past decade dismissing voters as bigots rather than asking why they were angry.

Von Storch’s challenge deserves to be examined seriously rather than reflexively dismissed. When she says “democrats have to talk to one another,” she is making a claim that, however cynically deployed, touches on a real tension in liberal democratic theory. A party that wins 43.8 percent of the vote in a free and fair election occupying a permanent constitutional exile is a novel and uncomfortable situation. The Weimar Republic analogy — which commentators reach for immediately — cuts both ways. Weimar fell not only because of extremist parties, but because mainstream parties were unable to form workable governing majorities and lost the faith of millions of citizens who concluded that the system was rigged against them. The firewall, if it simply produces deadlock or a fragile CDU minority propped up by left-wing parties against the manifest will of eastern German voters, risks recreating precisely the conditions of popular alienation it is meant to prevent.

Niall Ferguson has argued in a different context that Western elites habitually confuse the legitimacy of a democratic outcome with the desirability of its result. Saxony-Anhalt is a small state — 2.1 million people — but it sits within a national political landscape where the AfD leads federal opinion polls. Merz’s language of “profound reforms” and needing to “reach people at an emotional level” suggests he understands the problem at an intellectual level. Whether the CDU can actually deliver before the next federal cycle is another matter.

The idea being floated — that the left-wing populist BSW might provide tacit support for an AfD minority government without formally joining it — would represent a peculiar alliance of anti-establishment parties, one that prioritises migration restriction and Russian gas imports over ideological coherence. It is worth noting that BSW itself is “tough on immigration and backs importing Russian gas,” which raises uncomfortable questions about where the left-populist/right-populist boundary actually lies in eastern Germany’s post-industrial politics.

Two historical parallels are instructive. The cordon sanitaire applied to the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok in Belgium in the 1990s succeeded in temporarily containing the party — but also allowed its successor, Vlaams Belang, to position itself as a persecuted outsider, building a martyr’s brand that proved electorally durable for decades. The Swedish Democrats were excluded from formal coalition participation for years before the centre-right Tidö agreement incorporated their policy agenda in 2022. The Swedish path — engagement on policy, exclusion from office — produced a workable government and removed the protest-vote premium from the outsider party. Germany may eventually reach a similar accommodation; the question is whether its political class has the nerve and the competence to manage that transition without either capitulating to the AfD’s worst instincts or burning through its remaining democratic legitimacy in the attempt.

US President Trump’s Truth Social post amplifying the Saxony-Anhalt results, and Russian presidential envoy Kirill Dmitriev’s subsequent screenshot praising the AfD as “the party of hope and reason,” are worth registering as facts rather than as arguments. They do not determine the AfD’s character. But they illustrate why Germany’s allies are watching this coalition negotiation with a degree of anxiety that goes well beyond normal European domestic politics.

What to watch

  • Whether any CDU individual members break the firewall to support an AfD minority government, and how Merz responds — a test of party discipline with national implications.
  • The German constitutional court’s handling of any legal challenges to an AfD-led Saxony-Anhalt government, which could establish precedents for federal politics.
  • Upcoming state elections in Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania and Berlin, which Merz himself acknowledged “could have increasing significance.”
  • Whether the BSW’s tacit-support gambit, if attempted, triggers its own political crisis on the German left.

— J