Houthis take Mokha, and the world pays at the pump

Yemen’s Houthi movement has seized the strategic Red Sea port city of Mokha from Saudi-backed pro-government forces, according to military sources and witnesses cited by BBC News. The capture, confirmed on 11 September, leaves the Iran-aligned group only 75 kilometres from the Bab al-Mandab Strait — the narrow chokepoint that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and connects Asia to Europe. Hundreds of people have reportedly been killed and thousands displaced since the Houthis launched a fresh offensive in south-western Yemen a week ago. A Saudi-led coalition has responded with air strikes, and the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Saudi cities and oil facilities. Oil prices rose to $105 a barrel on Thursday amid these fears, according to BBC Business, contributing to a surge in UK government borrowing costs to their highest level in decades.

The received wisdom

The dominant framing of the Mokha seizure casts it as a legitimate resistance story, or at least an inevitable outgrowth of the Saudi-led war that has ravaged Yemen for over a decade. The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, say they are defending Yemeni sovereignty and retaliating against a Saudi blockade of their ports and an air strike on Sanaa airport. The broader international left and many humanitarian organisations argue that Saudi Arabia and its Western backers have prolonged Yemen’s suffering through arms sales and diplomatic cover, and that the Houthis’ gains simply reflect the bankruptcy of that strategy. From this view, the international community’s outrage is selective: it mourns shipping disruption more than Yemeni civilian deaths.

There is something to that charge. The Saudi coalition has killed large numbers of civilians since 2015 through air strikes, and Western governments have been slow to apply consistent pressure. The Houthis’ popular support within their zones of control is real, not manufactured.

A different read

But the good-faith humanitarian framing tends to obscure what Mokha’s fall actually means in structural terms — and what it tells us about the limits of American strategy.

The Bab al-Mandab Strait handles roughly 6–8 percent of global trade. Since the US-Israeli campaign against Iran effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, global shipping has already been under enormous strain. The Houthis’ seizure of Mokha now puts the southern chokepoint of the Arabian Peninsula under threat as well. The group explicitly reiterated its embargo on Saudi shipping even as it reassured international vessels. These two positions are not easily reconciled: Saudi Arabia ships oil exports through the Red Sea precisely because Hormuz is no longer reliably usable.

The consequence is already visible in markets. Natural gas prices in the UK rose above 200p a therm for the first time since 2022. UK 30-year bond yields are now at levels last seen in 1998. In other words, a war on Iran has metastasised into a cost-of-living crisis in Birmingham and Bristol.

The deeper problem is conceptual. American grand strategy since February has operated on the premise that maximum pressure on Iran would produce a quick resolution — or at minimum, a contained conflict. The Iran war has instead had cascading second-order effects: the Houthis reinvigorated, Somali pirates returning to the seas (as the Guardian reported earlier this week), global naval resources stretched between multiple theatres, and an oil price spike that is now undermining the political sustainability of the very war it was meant to win.

There is a historical parallel worth considering. During the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the US discovered that military power in the Middle East had limited traction against asymmetric economic leverage. The Houthis are not OPEC, but they do control a geography that the global economy cannot easily route around. In July, approximately 70 percent of maritime traffic that previously went through the Red Sea was already being rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, according to a Guardian analysis citing Center for Maritime Security data. Adding Bab al-Mandab instability on top of Hormuz closure is not a linear escalation — it is an exponential one.

The Houthis have been tactically opportunistic throughout this conflict, expanding their capabilities during periods of international distraction. The seizure of Zuqar Island in the Red Sea — reported alongside the Mokha news — suggests a methodical campaign to dominate Yemeni littoral waters, not a one-off raid. Tarek Salah, leader of the pro-government National Resistance Forces, acknowledged that his forces had paid “a heavy price” in the face of “a Houthi offensive planned and supported by Iran.”

The Saudi-led coalition’s capacity to reverse these gains is genuinely uncertain. Years of failed counterinsurgency and a coalition whose internal coherence has been strained by Saudi-Emirati tensions — the Saudi military struck what it described as a UAE-linked weapons shipment to Yemeni separatists as recently as December — leaves Riyadh in a difficult position. And while the US has been largely consumed by its direct confrontation with Iran, the proxy war in Yemen has grown more dangerous, not less.

President Trump said at the Republican convention in Dallas on Wednesday that he did not expect the Iran conflict to end before the November midterms. That timeline may now be tested much sooner by the consequences spilling into global energy markets.

What to watch

  • Whether Saudi Arabia requests direct US military support for operations on Yemen’s western coast, which would formally expand America’s military footprint.
  • Oil price trajectory: sustained above $105 a barrel risks tipping several European economies into recession.
  • Whether the Houthis attempt to threaten or blockade civilian shipping through Bab al-Mandab, as opposed to their current declared embargo on Saudi vessels only.
  • The response of China, which is Yemen’s largest creditor and has growing commercial interests in Red Sea logistics — Beijing’s position on Houthi expansion will matter enormously.

— J