North Korea's nuclear expansion and the IAEA's impotence

The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that North Korea has constructed a second uranium enrichment facility at its main Yongbyon nuclear site, capable of housing up to 28 centrifuge cascades, according to a Guardian report on the agency’s latest assessment. The IAEA, whose inspectors were expelled from North Korea in 2009, identified the new building by comparing satellite imagery with state media photographs of a June visit by Kim Jong-un, during which the leader claimed North Korea’s capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material had more than doubled over five years. The regime has also expanded operations at an enrichment site at Kangson, near Pyongyang. Based on a 2025 analysis by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the 28 potential cascades — comprising approximately 4,592 centrifuges — could yield around 85 kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium per year, enough for three or four additional warheads annually. South Korea’s defence minister estimated in August that North Korea now possesses between 80 and 120 nuclear warheads, significantly higher than Trump’s own cited figure of 57. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said the ongoing expansion was “a cause for serious concern” and “clear violations of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”

The received wisdom

The liberal-internationalist response to the IAEA report is essentially to call for more diplomacy. The argument runs as follows: North Korea has expanded its nuclear programme during periods of US hostility (Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, Trump’s first term maximum pressure), and made tentative steps toward engagement during periods of dialogue. The lesson from this pattern, on the progressive view, is that a credible, sustained diplomatic process — backed by genuine security guarantees and sanctions relief — could arrest or reverse the programme. The IAEA itself, and most Western foreign ministries, endorse a return to some form of Six-Party Talks framework or its successor.

The corollary argument is that the US has repeatedly undermined nonproliferation by maintaining its own nuclear arsenal, failing to honour the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s disarmament commitments, and using military force against countries that lacked nuclear weapons (Iraq, Libya) while negotiating with those that have them. North Korea, on this view, has drawn entirely rational conclusions from the post-2003 international order.

A different read

The diplomatic case is not without merit — the Bush administration’s hardline stance during the early 2000s did accelerate North Korean programme development rather than arrest it. But the weight of evidence now suggests that the diplomatic optimism has been running on borrowed time for a long time.

North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests. Kim Jong-un has presided over a ballistic missile programme that now includes intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and — according to the Guardian’s report — a stated commitment to “exponentially strengthen” nuclear forces. These are not the actions of a government exploring diplomatic off-ramps. They are the actions of a state that has internalised nuclear deterrence as the permanent foundation of its security strategy. Grossi’s report acknowledges as much by noting the “continuation and further development” of the programme as the IAEA’s consistent finding.

The structural problem is institutional. The IAEA was expelled from Pyongyang in 2009, meaning all its assessments since then have been based on satellite imagery, open-source material, and defector accounts — not on-site inspection. The agency can describe what North Korea is probably doing; it cannot verify anything. This is not a procedural footnote. It means the international community’s primary nonproliferation body has been effectively blind to the world’s fastest-growing nuclear programme for seventeen years. The new Yongbyon facility was identified only because Kim chose to publicise his visit to it for domestic propaganda purposes — a remarkable window onto how little we would know if Pyongyang exercised routine operational security.

The South Korean government’s figure of 80–120 warheads, if accurate, places North Korea in a different strategic category than it occupied even five years ago. A state with 80 warheads can absorb a first strike and still retain a credible second-strike deterrent. That changes the mathematics of any US military option entirely, and it means that the window for military pressure to meaningfully constrain the programme — already narrow — has likely closed.

The broader nonproliferation lesson here is worth stating plainly. States that invest in nuclear weapons under sanctions acquire them. Sanctions may complicate the timeline but have not, in any documented case, stopped a determined programme. The IAEA’s procedural condemnations — “deeply regrettable,” “serious concern,” “clear violations” — are not policy tools. They are expressions of institutional frustration. The UN Security Council has passed multiple resolutions condemning North Korean nuclear activities since 2006; each one has been ignored.

The policy community increasingly debates whether the appropriate goal for the US and its allies should shift from denuclearisation — which most analysts now consider unachievable without regime change, itself far too destabilising to contemplate — to deterrence management: establishing stable communication channels, redlines, and crisis-resolution mechanisms with a nuclear-armed North Korea. This is an uncomfortable destination, but it may be the only honest one left.

What to watch

  • Whether South Korea pursues its own nuclear weapons programme in response — public support for indigenous deterrence in Seoul has grown significantly as the North’s arsenal expands.
  • China’s reaction: Beijing remains North Korea’s primary economic lifeline and the only state with meaningful leverage over Pyongyang. How Beijing responds to the IAEA report will signal whether any coercive diplomacy is possible.
  • US midterm politics and their implications for North Korea policy — a Republican Congress retaining Trump’s coalition faces different domestic incentives than a divided government.
  • Whether any back-channel diplomatic contact exists between Washington and Pyongyang, and whether the IAEA report creates pressure to restart formal talks.

— J