Yemen’s Houthi forces have seized Perim Island, also known as Mayyun, at the narrowest point of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, completing their capture of the entire Red Sea coastline after taking the port city of Mokha the previous day. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia’s east-west oil pipeline — the kingdom’s principal bypass route around the now-closed Strait of Hormuz — was hit by drone strikes launched from Iraq, causing injuries and a precautionary shutdown. The UN’s International Organization for Migration reports at least 46,000 people displaced by the fighting, a figure it described as “alarmingly rising by the hour.” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reportedly pressed US President Donald Trump to intervene militarily. Trump has so far declined, offering intelligence and targeting support instead.
The received wisdom
The mainstream framing of the Houthi advance is straightforward: an Iran-backed militia, emboldened by the broader US-Iran conflict and Saudi Arabia’s deepening strategic isolation, has exploited a military vacuum to seize territory that gives it leverage over global shipping. The humanitarian toll — tens of thousands displaced, cities under missile fire — is the moral core of the story. Progressives and many Western foreign-policy commentators argue that this is the inevitable blowback from a decade of Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, and that diplomatic engagement with the Houthis is the only realistic path to de-escalation. Some note that the Houthis have explicitly stated they will not target non-Saudi shipping, suggesting a degree of political calculation that leaves room for negotiation. The broader lesson, in this reading, is that Washington’s willingness to arm and back Riyadh for years has produced this crisis, and the US now has a responsibility to restrain rather than reinforce Saudi military action.
A different read
That framing is not wrong, but it is radically incomplete. The Houthis are not a regional quirk awaiting diplomatic incorporation — they are an Iranian force-projection instrument that has just seized physical control of one of the world’s six critical maritime chokepoints. Perim Island sits where the Red Sea narrows to roughly 30 kilometres. The Bab al-Mandab already carries around 6-7 million barrels of oil per day in normal times. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed since the US-Iran war began, the Bab al-Mandab became the last viable Red Sea exit for Gulf oil headed to Europe and Asia. Saudi Arabia had been routing crude via its east-west pipeline to the Red Sea coast precisely to avoid Hormuz — that pipeline is now also struck.
This is not incidental collateral damage. It is a methodical campaign to close every oil bypass route simultaneously. The decision to attack the Saudi pipeline from Iraqi territory is particularly significant: it implicates Iran-aligned Shia militias in Iraq — the Popular Mobilisation Forces, or Hashd al-Shaabi — in a cross-border act of economic warfare. Iraq’s own government promptly condemned the attack and promised an investigation, but Baghdad’s ability to control PMF elements operating independently is, to put it charitably, limited. This is how Iran has long operated: advancing its strategic position through proxy actors while maintaining plausible deniability for the state.
The historical parallel is instructive. In 1973, Arab states weaponised the oil chokepoint in retaliation for US support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The result was an oil embargo that shattered Western economic confidence for a decade, ended the postwar Keynesian consensus, and ultimately reshuffled global politics in ways that reverberated into the Reagan era. The current situation is structurally different — the US is now a net oil exporter — but the vulnerability is not uniform. Europe, Japan, South Korea, and most of the developing world remain heavily exposed to Persian Gulf supply chains. US diesel prices have already surpassed $6 a gallon, with Brent crude above $105 a barrel. For Nigeria, Indonesia, and Lebanon — countries that import Middle East oil and lack the hard currency buffers of the Gulf states — the squeeze is already existential.
Trump’s refusal to commit US military force against the Houthis deserves scrutiny. The logic seems to be that involvement would further inflame the Iran conflict before the midterms. But that calculus assumes the Houthis’ campaign has a ceiling — that seizing a coastline and shutting pipelines is the limit of their ambition. Nothing in the past three weeks suggests that. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reported personal appeal to Trump is a signal of genuine desperation from a leader who has staked his domestic legitimacy on Vision 2030’s prosperity narrative, which depends on oil revenues that are now physically threatened. If Washington cannot or will not guarantee the security of Gulf energy infrastructure, the implicit guarantee that has underpinned US strategic position in the Gulf since the Carter Doctrine of 1980 is visibly collapsing — and every regional actor is watching.
What to watch
- Whether Iran engages in promised talks with Gulf states on Monday about the Strait of Hormuz — Iran has signalled it will discuss the waterway’s status — and whether that represents a genuine off-ramp or diplomatic theatre.
- Saudi Arabia’s military response: Riyadh said it reserved the right to “all necessary measures” but held off at Iraq’s request. How long that restraint holds under further infrastructure attacks.
- Whether the Houthis move to impose tolls or inspection regimes on non-Saudi shipping transiting the Bab al-Mandab — the next logical escalation step.
- Brent crude’s trajectory past $105: each $10 increment adds approximately $0.25 to US retail petrol and materially tightens monetary policy globally.
— J