A Hong Kong court sentenced three leaders of the now-disbanded Hong Kong Alliance to prison terms of up to seven years and three months on Friday. Lee Cheuk-yan, 69, received seven years; Chow Hang-tung, 41, received seven years and three months; and Albert Ho, 74, who had pleaded guilty, received five years. The three were convicted of inciting others to subvert state power under the national security law, which came into force in 2020. Their core offence, as summarised by the court, was that their organisation had “incited other persons to organise, plan, commit or participate in acts by unlawful means with a view to subverting the state power” — specifically, their organisation’s slogan calling for an end to one-party rule and their coordination of annual Tiananmen vigils that once attracted over 100,000 people. The UN human rights office called for the sentences to be quashed. Amnesty International described the outcome as “a triple tragedy.” The Hong Kong Alliance was also fined HK$1.5 million ($191,000).
The received wisdom
Human rights organisations, Western governments, and the international media have responded with a template that is both accurate and, by now, somewhat ritualised: the sentences are draconian, the NSL was designed to silence dissent, Hong Kong’s promised autonomy under the “one country, two systems” framework has been extinguished. Lee, Chow, and Ho were peaceful activists engaged in annual commemoration of a massacre — the Chinese Communist Party’s violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, in which estimates of the death toll range from hundreds to many thousands. The vigils were a civic ritual, not an armed insurrection. In this reading, Beijing has achieved what it set out to do: the prosecution of memory itself. The appropriate response, most commentators argue, is continued international condemnation, visa restrictions on NSL enforcers, and support for Hong Kongers who have emigrated.
A different read
None of that is wrong. But the full significance of Friday’s sentences requires a slightly different frame — one less focused on the individual injustice and more attentive to what the CCP has learned about the architecture of control.
Hong Kong and Macau were, for three decades, the only places on Chinese soil where the Tiananmen massacre could be publicly commemorated. The vigils ran from 1990 until they were banned in 2020 under cover of Covid-19 restrictions, and never resumed once the NSL was in place. That three-decade gap between the massacre and its effective erasure from Hong Kong’s public life tells you something important: the CCP tolerated the vigils for a long time precisely because Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre made the soft-power cost of suppression higher than the reputational cost of permitting them. The calculation changed when Hong Kong’s utility as a uniquely open interface between China and global capital was gradually superseded by Shanghai and Shenzhen.
The NSL was designed not merely to suppress active resistance but to criminalise the infrastructure of memory — the organisations, the slogans, the annual rituals through which a society processes historical trauma. This is not Orwellian metaphor; it is Orwellian literalism. Chow Hang-tung told the court in May that “the law itself was on trial.” She was right, but she was also wrong about the verdict: the law prevailed. The court ruled that chanting “end one-party dictatorship” is not protected political speech but incitement to subvert state power. That is the jurisprudential frame Beijing needed. It transforms any organised political criticism of CCP governance — not merely in Hong Kong but potentially anywhere subject to Chinese jurisdiction — into a criminal act.
The international community’s response has been notably impotent. The UK government’s West Bank sanctions announced this week generated far more diplomatic friction than the NSL sentences that followed several years of prosecution. This disparity tells us something uncomfortable: liberal democracies are willing to impose costs on middle-ranking powers like Israel when the domestic political constituency demands it, but China — with its trade leverage, its manufacturing dominance, its role in global supply chains — operates largely beyond the sphere of meaningful external accountability. The sentences handed to Lee, Chow, and Ho will produce condemnation statements, academic papers, and perhaps some targeted visa restrictions. They will not alter the Chinese Communist Party’s calculation by a single basis point.
The more pertinent question is what this means for Taiwan, whose own political class watches Hong Kong with the understanding that “one country, two systems” is not a constitutional guarantee but a probationary arrangement that Beijing can revise at will when it chooses. The vigil organisers were not armed. They were not funded by foreign powers. They lit candles. If that is sedition, then the scope for any political life outside CCP approval in China’s sphere of influence is precisely zero.
What to watch
- Whether Lee Cheuk-yan and Chow Hang-tung pursue their announced appeals and what procedural latitude the Hong Kong court of appeal allows — the outcome will signal whether any residual judicial independence persists.
- The trajectory of the remaining political trials under the NSL: there are dozens of defendants still in the pipeline from the 2020-21 wave of arrests.
- Whether any G7 government moves beyond condemnation to concrete action — targeted sanctions on NSL prosecutors and judges have been mooted but not implemented.
- The wider diplomatic fallout at the ongoing BRICS summit in Delhi, where India must manage its relationship with Beijing while remaining a democracy committed, at least formally, to rule-of-law norms.
— J