Sweden's right falls, but the story isn't over

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson resigned on Thursday after his centre-right bloc lost a slim majority to the Social Democrats, led by Magdalena Andersson. The BBC reported Kristersson’s resignation following what the Guardian described as a centre-left bloc winning a slim majority. In her victory speech, Andersson said Swedes had “voted for a new direction for our country, voted for unity and against division.” The Kristersson government had been notable in European terms for governing with the parliamentary support — though not formal coalition membership — of the Sweden Democrats, a party with historical roots in far-right nationalism that has since moderated into a mainstream anti-immigration force. This alignment attracted considerable international attention and criticism; its end is being greeted in many European capitals with visible relief. This was, the coverage implies, a return to something normal. It may be premature to draw that conclusion.

The received wisdom

The left-of-centre reading of this election result runs as follows: Sweden made a mistake in 2022 when it elected a government that depended on far-right support, and Swedes have now corrected it. The Sweden Democrats’ toxicity contaminated the broader Moderate-led alliance, pushing voters toward the Social Democrats under a capable, centrist leader. Andersson’s call for “unity against division” resonates because Swedes are fundamentally decent people who want pragmatic government, not culture-war politics. The lesson for Europe is clear: populist parties that appear to gain governing influence through the back door of parliamentary arithmetic eventually generate a correction. Democracy’s immune system works. The Guardian’s subtext — Klopp’s remarks about Germany’s AfD, published the same day — fits the same narrative: the far right’s advance is real, but it can be checked.

A different read

The structural argument for scepticism about this comfortable reading requires engaging with what actually happened in Sweden over the past four years — and what did not.

When the Kristersson government took office in late 2022, Sweden had one of the highest per-capita rates of asylum acceptance in Europe. Gang violence — disproportionately involving second-generation immigrants — had become a genuine political crisis, not merely a media confection. The Sweden Democrats’ rise from marginal party to kingmakers happened because a significant portion of the Swedish electorate decided that the governing consensus on immigration had failed them. The Kristersson government, with Sweden Democrat support, pushed through a significant tightening of immigration rules, including stricter family reunification criteria and new deportation agreements. Crime statistics, while contested, showed some stabilisation in certain categories.

The question that this election result does not answer — and that Andersson’s Social Democrats will now have to confront — is what they actually intend to do about the underlying issues. The Swedish Social Democrats of 2026 are not the Social Democrats of 1995. Under pressure from the Sweden Democrats’ rise, the party shifted considerably on immigration in the mid-2020s, dropping the more expansive positions it held in the 2015 migration crisis years. Andersson is not running on an open-borders platform. She is running on competent management and institutional trust.

There is a historical parallel worth consulting here. Norway’s Progress Party — also rooted in populist nationalism — entered government in 2013 under a Conservative-led coalition, served competently in the immigration ministry under Sylvi Listhaug, and then the coalition eventually fell. But Norwegian immigration policy did not return to its pre-2013 settings. The overton window had shifted. Something similar may be occurring in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats moved the centre of political gravity on immigration and public safety to a position where even the Social Democrats cannot simply reverse course.

The BBC also noted that eight German state premiers backed Friedrich Merz as speculation about his future grew — a reminder that the broader European picture of rising right-wing pressure on mainstream parties has not changed because of one Swedish result. The Guardian’s report on Islamist violence in Africa’s Sahel reaching record levels, published days before the Swedish election, is a reminder that the migration pressures that shaped Swedish politics over the past decade have not abated at their source.

Andersson may govern well. The Social Democrats have real governing competence and Sweden’s institutions are strong. But describing this result as a repudiation of populism is to confuse the tactical outcome with the structural conditions. The Sweden Democrats will not disappear. Their voters will not vanish. The issues that propelled them — crime, migration, cultural anxiety — will not be resolved by a slight parliamentary majority shifting left. The temperature has been lowered. It has not been cured.

What to watch

  • The Sweden Democrats’ response in opposition: do they moderate further to position for the next election, or pivot to more confrontational tactics?
  • Whether Andersson’s government reverses any of the Kristersson immigration tightening — and at what political cost if it does.
  • Swedish crime statistics over the next twelve months: will they provide or undercut the narrative that the Kristersson-SD collaboration had produced results?
  • Whether Germany’s forthcoming federal dynamic — with Merz navigating AfD pressure — follows a similar trajectory, or diverges.

— J