Milei's Argentina and the austerity test

Argentina’s opposition left staged what it called a “March of Anger” on Saturday, drawing significant crowds in Buenos Aires and other major cities to protest President Javier Milei’s sweeping austerity programme. The demonstrations were organised by a coalition of trade unions, Peronist party structures, and social movements, united by opposition to spending cuts that have hit pensions, education subsidies, and public sector employment. Milei has been in office for less than two years, inheriting an economy with annual inflation above 200 percent, a central bank with negative net reserves, a black-market dollar rate at more than double the official rate, and a state apparatus that had spent decades running structural deficits financed by money printing. His administration’s “chainsaw” approach to public spending has produced what he claimed it would: a primary fiscal surplus, a sharp drop in the monthly inflation rate, and a tentative stabilisation of the currency. The political cost, measured in the streets this weekend, is becoming visible.

The received wisdom

The left’s critique of Milei’s economic programme is mounted in humanitarian terms, and it is not without empirical support. Poverty in Argentina has risen sharply over the course of the austerity shock; real wages have fallen; food insecurity has increased. The argument is that Milei is conducting an ideological experiment on a population that cannot afford it — that his libertarian austerity is a foreign-designed programme, shaped by IMF conditionality and Chicago School theory, that immiserates working-class Argentines in the short term with speculative promises of long-term growth that will not materialise or will materialise only for a narrow elite. Historically, this argument points to the failure of Argentina’s Convertibility Plan in the 1990s — another round of IMF-backed reforms that produced apparent stability before collapsing catastrophically in the 2001 crisis, with devastating consequences for ordinary Argentines.

There is a version of this critique that serious right-of-centre analysts must take seriously. Austerity applied too fast, without adequate social cushions, can produce political instability that destroys the conditions necessary for the investment and growth the reformers promised. The pace and sequencing of reform matters, not just its direction.

A different read

But the Peronist alternative has been tested repeatedly in Argentina, and its record is precisely the trap Milei is trying to escape. Argentina is not an economy that has been damaged by an excess of fiscal conservatism. It is one of the most dramatic examples in modern history of what happens when a country systematically refuses to live within its means — not for a year or a decade but for most of the past century.

Consider the trajectory. Argentina was among the ten wealthiest countries on earth in 1913, richer per capita than France or Germany. It has spent the century since oscillating between populist spending cycles and crisis, each round of Peronist redistribution financed by money printing or commodity booms, each boom ending in inflation, currency collapse, and an emergency stabilisation that the next Peronist administration blamed on the IMF rather than on its own predecessors’ choices. The 2001 crisis, cited by the left as the warning against Milei-style reform, was itself the consequence of the fiscal irresponsibility of the 1990s — not of the reform programme designed to address it. The Convertibility Plan failed not because the underlying fiscal adjustment was wrong but because the political class refused to implement it fully, leaving the state running deficits while pretending to have a hard currency peg.

Milei’s approach is genuinely radical, and some of his rhetoric about the state is more ideological performance than serious policy analysis. His decision to dollarise — or to threaten dollarisation — as a commitment device is controversial among economists, including right-of-centre economists who are broadly sympathetic to his diagnosis. But the core task he set himself — ending primary deficits, stopping the money printing, restoring basic price stability — is not ideological caprice. It is the prerequisite for any economic development at all. An economy with 200 percent annual inflation cannot attract investment, cannot allow ordinary citizens to plan, cannot sustain the kind of productive activity that generates real wage growth. The march’s placards demanding restored pension indexation and higher education subsidies are understandable expressions of real hardship. What they do not explain is where the money would come from that does not involve either new borrowing or new money printing — both of which produce the very inflation that destroys the real value of the pensions they claim to be defending.

Brazil’s Lula, by contrast, is currently announcing higher welfare payments and free weight-loss drugs ahead of his own election, financed through debt. This is the regional template the Argentine left implicitly proposes: short-term popular legitimacy purchased with long-term fiscal instability. The pattern is as old as Latin American populism itself, and its consequences are equally predictable.

The right-of-centre case for Milei is not that his methods are gentle or his political style admirable — they are neither. It is that Argentina has run out of clever alternatives to the basic discipline of living within its means, and that the pain now is the consequence of the choices made by the governments that preceded him, not of the attempt to correct them.

What to watch

Monthly inflation trajectory. If Milei’s programme is working, inflation should continue its decline from its peak. A reversal would be devastating both politically and in terms of IMF credibility, which underpins his financing arrangements.

IMF programme reviews. Argentina’s access to IMF credit tranches is contingent on hitting fiscal targets. Any slippage will be reported; watch whether the Fund publicly endorses or quietly expresses concerns.

Peronist coalition unity. The “March of Anger” is a signal of organisational capacity, but the Peronist coalition is deeply fragmented. Whether it can present a unified presidential candidate in time for the next election will determine whether the protest energy translates into electoral threat.

Poverty and social indicators. If real wages begin recovering and poverty indicators stabilise — which Milei’s team projects will happen in the second year of stabilisation — the political calculus changes. If they do not, the social and political pressure becomes potentially ungovernable.

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