Merz's historic defeat and the CDU's identity crisis

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described his party’s performance in a state election as a “disaster” on Sunday, even as he vowed to remain in office and press ahead with his economic reform agenda. The result confirmed what polling had suggested for months: the CDU/CSU, which swept back into federal power on promises of fiscal discipline, economic modernisation, and firm migration control, is haemorrhaging voters to both the far-right Alternative für Deutschland and to parties of the populist left, depending on the state. Merz has governed for less than a year, inheriting an economy in the grip of its longest industrial contraction since reunification, and is now facing the uncomfortable realisation that electoral mandates dissolve faster than structural reforms can be implemented. Germany’s broader reform travails are being watched closely across Europe.

The received wisdom

The progressive and centrist reading of this result is consoling in its familiarity: the CDU is suffering because it legitimised far-right rhetoric on migration, failed to invest adequately in public services, and alienated the moderate swing voters who handed it victory by pivoting too hard to economic austerity. On this account, Merz’s mistake was trying to out-AfD the AfD rather than offering a positive, forward-looking vision of Germany as a prosperous multicultural society with world-class green industries. The social democratic left makes a stronger version of this argument: that Germany’s industrial problems stem from underinvestment and wage suppression over two decades, and that the fiscal conservatism Merz champions is both economically misguided and politically self-defeating. If you want to win back working-class voters, the argument goes, give them something worth voting for — not lectures about the debt brake.

This reading is not entirely wrong. But it misses something important about what German voters are actually reacting to.

A different read

The CDU’s difficulty is not primarily a communications failure or a positioning miscalculation. It is a governing party caught between two genuine structural dilemmas: the limits of liberal economic consensus in an era of industrial disruption, and the demand for cultural reassurance that it has never quite known how to supply without self-contradiction.

Germany’s economic problems are real and deepening. The country built its post-war prosperity on a model of export-led manufacturing — particularly in automobiles and specialised machinery — underpinned by cheap Russian energy, open Chinese markets, and American security guarantees. All three pillars have cracked simultaneously. Russian gas is gone, Chinese industrial competition has become ferocious, and the Trump administration’s indifference to European security has forced Berlin to contemplate defence spending it had structurally avoided for a generation. Merz’s fiscal conservatism — the insistence on constitutional debt limits, Teutonic prudence over Keynesian stimulus — made political sense as an electoral position but is increasingly hard to sustain as a governing reality when the structural investment gap is measured in hundreds of billions.

There is a deeper problem. German centre-right politics has always operated in the shadow of a unique historical bargain: the CDU could claim to be the party of economic prosperity and social order, while carefully avoiding any rhetoric that might echo the nationalist register of the 1930s. That bargain worked for decades because prosperity was visible and the memory of catastrophe was vivid. Both conditions have weakened. The AfD has captured the “we want our country back” sentiment that the CDU cannot safely touch, while the SPD and Greens have successfully contested the growth-and-prosperity space with green industrial policy arguments. The CDU is squeezed.

Merz’s particular misfortune is that he won the chancellorship precisely at the moment when this structural squeeze became acute. His predecessors — most obviously Angela Merkel — managed the same dilemma by essentially refusing to resolve it: Merkel governed from a permanent triangulated centre, neutralising the AfD by occasionally borrowing its language and then dropping it, absorbing the SPD into grand coalitions, and deferring every hard decision about German identity and Germany’s role in the world. This was not inspiring, but it was stable. Merz ran explicitly against Merkel’s style — promising decisiveness, reform, and honest reckoning with Germany’s problems. Now the reckoning has arrived, and it turns out voters do not necessarily thank politicians for delivering on painful promises.

The conservative lesson here is not that Merz was wrong to try. Germany genuinely needs structural economic reform, more defence spending, and a more coherent migration system. It is that democratic politics operates on electoral cycles too short for structural adjustments to bear visible fruit, and governing parties that stake their identity on reform face a cruel timing problem. The voters who were promised change do not wait around to see if the prescription works.

What to watch

The debt brake debate. Merz’s economic reform agenda requires either creative accounting or a constitutional reform of Germany’s fiscal rules. Whether the CDU/CSU coalition can hold together on this question, or whether the FDP splinters again, will determine the government’s durability.

AfD’s governing trajectory. If the AfD continues growing in state polls, the question of whether they enter state governments becomes harder to avoid. The “firewall” against governing with them is already cracking at the municipal level.

European implications. Germany is Europe’s largest economy and the informal anchor of EU fiscal policy. A prolonged German political crisis has direct implications for the eurozone, for Ukraine aid, and for EU enlargement momentum.

— J