EU delists Russian oligarchs and the sanctions mirage

Ukraine reacted with fury on Tuesday after the European Union quietly removed a number of Russian oligarchs from its sanctions list, a development that landed in the same week that UNGA was producing its annual parade of solidarity speeches about Ukrainian sovereignty. The details remain opaque — the EU has not published a full accounting of which names were removed, citing ongoing legal proceedings — but the principle is clear enough: individuals who had been sanctioned as part of the West’s post-February 2022 economic response to the invasion have had their asset freezes and travel bans lifted. Kyiv’s anger is understandable. The EU’s explanation, insofar as there is one, rests on legal challenges to the sanctions’ procedural basis. But the episode illuminates something deeper about what Western economic pressure on Russia has and has not achieved.

The received wisdom

The standard defence of Russia sanctions runs as follows: they imposed real costs on Russian elites, restricted Moscow’s ability to finance the war through hard currency, and sent an unambiguous political signal of Western unity. The removal of specific oligarchs, in this reading, represents an unfortunate but manageable legal hiccup — the result of EU courts applying due process protections that any liberal legal order must extend even to odious actors. The principle that sanctions must be legally defensible is not a weakness but a feature; it is what distinguishes the EU’s approach from the arbitrary asset confiscation that characterises authoritarian states. Maintaining the principle, even at political cost, preserves the credibility of the legal instrument for future use.

A different read

The received wisdom is more self-serving than it sounds. The history of comprehensive economic sanctions as a tool of strategic coercion is not encouraging, and the EU’s delisting episode exposes tensions in the Russia sanctions regime that have been papered over for four years.

Begin with what sanctions actually did. The Russian economy contracted sharply in 2022, then recovered more strongly than most Western analysts predicted. Russia redirected its trade through third countries — Turkey, the UAE, and Central Asian intermediaries — and found buyers for its energy exports in Asia. Europe, meanwhile, spent 2022-2024 managing an energy crisis caused partly by its own rapid decoupling from Russian gas, which contributed directly to the industrial troubles now engulfing its manufacturing base. Sir Jim Ratcliffe this week suspended production at key UK plants, blaming high gas prices — a direct downstream effect of the energy disruption the sanctions regime helped generate. The sanctions imposed costs on both sides; they did not impose them asymmetrically enough to compel a change in Russian behaviour.

The oligarch channel was always the weakest link in this logic. The theory was that sanctioning Putin’s inner circle would create internal pressure on the Kremlin — that wealthy Russians with yachts in Monaco and children in London schools would lobby against the war. This theory was wrong. Russian elites, however uncomfortable, did not constitute an effective opposition to Putin’s war aims in 2022, and they have not done so since. The confiscated yachts made excellent photographs; they did not change the correlation of forces in Donbas.

The legal challenge problem is revealing about something the EU would prefer not to examine. The EU’s sanctions were constructed hastily, under enormous political pressure, with insufficient attention to procedural requirements that EU courts would subsequently apply. The result is a sanctions architecture that is legally fragile and practically reversible — which means it was always more effective as a political statement than as a durable strategic instrument. Compare this to the far more precisely targeted financial sanctions the US Treasury uses, built on decades of legal infrastructure: the difference in durability is not accidental.

Ukraine’s anger is legitimate but also somewhat misplaced. The delisting is a symptom, not the disease. The disease is that the EU constructed a grand gesture and called it a strategy. Genuine strategic pressure on Russia would require sustained defence production commitments, continued military aid to Ukraine, and long-term energy policy that reduces European dependence on Russian hydrocarbons — all things that are harder, more expensive, and less photogenic than freezing an oligarch’s yacht. Europe is beginning to move on defence spending, driven partly by the US pressure that the Greenland deal exemplifies. But the sanctions episode is a reminder that rhetorical solidarity and structural commitment are not the same thing.

What to watch

  • Whether Ukraine demands a formal EU explanation of which names were removed and on what legal basis — a test of Kyiv’s diplomatic leverage within the EU framework.
  • Legal proceedings in EU courts: if the judicial basis for oligarch sanctions continues to be challenged successfully, the entire regime faces a slow unravelling.
  • Whether the delisting prompts Russia to move more assets through de-sanctioned intermediaries, testing whether the practical effect of the list was ever larger than its political effect.
  • German and French reaction: Berlin and Paris have historically been the most interested in finding off-ramps with Moscow; the delisting may reflect their preferences more than it does Brussels bureaucratic error.

— J