A group of 31 Democratic members of the US Congress sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week, accusing the Trump administration of making “an apparent effort to interfere with, and potentially undermine” Brazil’s presidential election, the first round of which is scheduled for 4 October. Brazil — Latin America’s largest country and one of the world’s top ten economies — is heading into a vote that polls show as effectively a tie between incumbent leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and far-right Senator Flávio Bolsonaro. The Guardian’s report notes that Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodríguez simultaneously met with Trump in New York on the sidelines of UNGA, posing for photographs with the US president less than nine months after Trump ordered the abduction of her predecessor, Nicolás Maduro. Taken together, these developments sketch a Latin American policy that is highly transactional and ideologically selective.
The received wisdom
The progressive case against US involvement in Brazilian politics is straightforward: the United States has a long, well-documented history of interfering in Latin American elections and governments — from the CIA’s role in Chile 1973 to support for right-wing governments throughout the Cold War — and any Trump administration tilt toward the Bolsonaro camp would represent a continuation of that pattern. From this view, the Democratic letter to Rubio is a legitimate exercise of congressional oversight, and the accusation of interference is not merely partisan point-scoring but reflects genuine institutional concern about American foreign policy being used to tilt a democratic contest toward a preferred ideological outcome.
There is also a specific dimension to worry about: Jair Bolsonaro’s conduct after the 2022 Brazilian election — in which he refused to concede defeat and tacitly encouraged the January 8, 2023 storming of government buildings in Brasília — represents a documented threat to Brazilian democratic institutions. His son Flávio Bolsonaro now carries that political inheritance into the 2026 campaign, and any US encouragement of that candidacy carries the implicit risk of legitimising anti-democratic conduct.
A different read
All of this has force. But the Democratic letter’s framing also deserves some scrutiny that it is unlikely to receive in most media coverage.
The accusation of “interfering” in foreign elections is being made by the same political coalition that spent significant institutional and media energy asserting that the Russian Federation’s attempts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represented an unprecedented assault on democratic sovereignty. The principle that external actors should not attempt to tilt electoral outcomes is either universal or it is not; if it is a principle, it applies to American conduct in Brazilian elections just as it applies to Russian conduct in American ones.
But the more interesting question raised by the Brazil situation is about what kind of relationship between great powers and smaller democracies is actually consistent with democratic norms. The United States has never, in its history as a global power, adopted a posture of genuine non-interference in the political outcomes of strategically important countries. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1904, explicitly claimed an American right to intervene in Latin American affairs when US interests were threatened. That doctrine has never been formally repudiated; it has merely been rebranded. President Obama’s administration also conducted extensive democracy-promotion programs whose practical effect was to disadvantage governments Washington found uncongenial, even when those governments had been democratically elected.
The Trump administration’s approach differs in degree and style — its transactionalism is less disguised, its preference for strongman allies more overt — but not necessarily in fundamental kind. What is new is the Venezuela deal’s brazenness: accepting a beaming photograph with Maduro’s interim successor while Maduro himself sits in a Brooklyn prison eight miles away is a remarkable act of foreign policy cognitive dissonance, even by the standards of great-power dealmaking.
The Milei precedent is also relevant context. At UNGA, Argentina’s President Javier Milei threatened to take “matters into our own hands” on the Falklands and attacked the UN as filled with “parasites” — rhetoric that sits comfortably within the ideological orbit that Trump himself has cultivated globally. The emergence of a loosely coordinated populist-right international network, linking Trump, Milei, Bolsonaro, and their respective movements, represents a genuine structural development in global politics that is distinct from, though related to, the specific question of US electoral interference in Brazil.
Whether any of this constitutes illegal interference in Brazilian sovereignty — as opposed to ideological solidarity and diplomatic signalling — is a question the Democratic letter raises but does not, based on available reporting, answer with specific evidence. The distinction matters for legal and diplomatic purposes, even if the broader pattern of influence is clear enough.
What to watch
- 4 October first round: The actual vote will be the first real test of whether external political pressure has had any measurable effect on Brazilian public opinion.
- Rubio’s response: How the State Department answers the Democratic letter — if it does at all — will indicate how concerned the administration is about the interference narrative taking hold before the midterms.
- Bolsonaro and democratic norms: Whether the younger Bolsonaro’s campaign explicitly commits to accepting electoral results will be a significant signal for those tracking democratic backsliding risk in Brazil.
- IMF and Brazilian economy: Brazil’s economic trajectory intersects with the electoral outcome in complex ways; the IMF’s recent warnings to the UK and US about debt costs apply to Brazil’s own fiscal situation as well, and economic conditions will shape the vote at least as much as geopolitical maneuvering.
— J