Fighting has resumed in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, with both the federal government and Tigray forces accusing each other of launching offensive operations. The BBC reported that the mutual accusations are “fuelling fears of a new war” — a phrase that understates the situation, given that what is being described is an active military confrontation between forces that spent two years engaged in one of the deadliest conflicts of the 21st century. Al Jazeera noted that Ethiopia’s government issued warnings of potential “destruction” as Tigray rebel forces launched what it characterised as an offensive. The 2022 Pretoria Agreement, brokered with considerable diplomatic fanfare by the African Union, was supposed to have ended the conflict that killed an estimated 300,000 to 600,000 people. That agreement is now in serious jeopardy, if it has not already collapsed entirely.
The received wisdom
The received wisdom on the Tigray war, when Western commentators pay attention to it at all, is structured around two interlocking narratives. The first is humanitarian: the conflict produced staggering atrocities, including mass rape as a weapon of war, famine conditions affecting millions, and allegations of genocide. International organisations and advocacy groups emphasise continued accountability for these crimes as the precondition for durable peace. The second narrative is diplomatic: the Pretoria Agreement was a genuine achievement of African-led mediation, and its fragility is primarily a function of continued spoiler behaviour by hardliners on both sides. The solution, in this framing, is more international monitoring, more aid conditionality, and sustained diplomatic pressure to enforce the peace terms. The underlying assumption is that the international community, properly resourced and motivated, can manage these dynamics from a distance.
A different read
The optimism that greeted the Pretoria Agreement was always somewhat detached from conditions on the ground, and what is happening now is less a surprise than an accounting.
The agreement had a structural problem that was visible from the outset: it required the disarmament of Tigray Defence Forces without resolving the underlying political disputes — including the status of contested territories in Amhara and Afar regions, the question of Tigrayan representation in the federal government, and the accountability demands of communities that experienced mass violence. These were not details to be worked out later; they were the core of the conflict. When a peace process names these as deferred issues rather than central ones, it is not ending a war — it is scheduling its resumption.
The broader pattern here is one that appears repeatedly in African peace agreements that receive intense external attention at signing and then rapid external disengagement thereafter. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (2005) ended a 22-year war, won its architects a Nobel Prize, and produced an independent South Sudan that descended into its own catastrophic civil war within years. The pattern is not coincidence; it reflects the structural reality that international attention is a scarce resource that moves on to the next crisis, while the local actors who will live with the peace agreement — and the grievances it did not resolve — remain in place.
The conservative instinct in situations like this is to be sceptical of the international-community-as-deus-ex-machina story. Not because Ethiopians do not deserve peace, or because outside pressure cannot play a useful role, but because treating external mediation as sufficient substitute for genuine political settlement is a recipe for exactly what we are now seeing. The Pretoria process succeeded in pausing the fighting; it did not resolve the political order questions that made the fighting necessary, in the calculation of those who fought it.
What is missing from most of the coverage is a clear-eyed accounting of the humanitarian machine that was deployed after the first phase of the Tigray war. As the Guardian’s reporting on US aid withdrawal in Africa makes clear, American withdrawal from African aid programmes has already put healthcare infrastructure “under growing strain.” A resumption of large-scale conflict in Ethiopia will make that pressure acute. The populations of Tigray and surrounding regions are not abstract beneficiaries of diplomatic goodwill; they are people who have already survived atrocities that the world spent relatively little political capital preventing, and who are now facing the prospect of going through it again.
The accountability question here is distributed. It belongs to Ethiopian federal authorities who pursued a military rather than political approach to Tigrayan autonomy. It belongs to Tigrayan leadership that calculated armed resistance as preferable to political compromise. And it belongs, in a smaller but real way, to the international community that declared a peace process successful, disengaged, and is now watching the consequences from a safe distance.
What to watch
Watch whether the African Union activates the monitoring mechanisms in the Pretoria Agreement or whether the response is primarily rhetorical. Watch the humanitarian situation in Tigray’s borderlands: access for aid organisations was already severely constrained before this latest escalation, and any major offensive will worsen it rapidly. Watch whether the United States or European Union ties any of their remaining bilateral engagement with Addis Ababa to concrete de-escalation steps — or whether they, too, move on to more prominent diplomatic theatres. The UN General Assembly this week, dominated by Ukraine and the Trump-Xi summit, is not making room for this story.
— J