Germany's centre and the ghosts it fears

Germany’s political centre is in a condition of public soul-searching after electoral gains by both the far-right AfD and the reconstituted far-left Die Linke pushed the established parties — CDU, SPD, Greens, and FDP — into an increasingly narrow electoral band, NPR reported. Centrist politicians are oscillating between two diagnoses: that they have failed to communicate the achievements of the mainstream, or that they have failed to address the legitimate grievances that drive voters to the extremes. The NPR report noted that the parallels commentators most reach for — weak coalitions, political fragmentation, a dire economy — echo “a past that led to the rise of fascism,” the Weimar comparison that haunts every German political conversation. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU holds the largest single bloc in the Bundestag, but governing majorities require coalition arithmetic that has grown increasingly painful, slow, and politically costly.

The received wisdom

The liberal-internationalist view of Germany’s political difficulty runs as follows: the AfD is an extremist, Russian-influenced, anti-democratic movement that has manipulated genuine anxieties — about migration, deindustrialisation, and energy costs — to build a constituency for something resembling European fascism. Die Linke, or whatever successor formation now holds its voters, represents a nostalgic leftism that cannot govern but can destabilise. The solution, in this reading, is for the mainstream to “reconnect” with voters, improve communication, and defend democratic norms more clearly, while refusing to legitimate the extremes by borrowing their language on migration or fiscal discipline. There are sophisticated people who hold this view, and it is not entirely wrong. The AfD’s entanglement with Russian networks is well-documented. Its leadership’s relationship with the legal limits of German democracy is genuinely troubling. Any analysis that dismisses these concerns is not serious.

A different read

The problem with the mainstream analysis — and this is the conversation Germany’s political class most strenuously avoids — is that it confuses cause and effect. The extremes did not create the grievances; they merely harvested them. And the mainstream parties created the conditions for that harvest.

Consider the economic picture. Germany’s industrial model, built on cheap Russian energy and access to Chinese markets, has been structurally disrupted since 2022. The energy transition — compressed into an accelerated timeline that reflected Green Party ideology more than engineering reality — simultaneously raised household bills and industrial input costs. BBC Business has reported that European car manufacturers face an existential crisis: they are too expensive to compete with Chinese EVs in the middle market, and the transition subsidies that were supposed to cushion the shift have been inadequate and badly targeted. This is not the AfD’s doing. It is the consequence of a decade of energy and industrial policy made by precisely the centrist parties now bewailing their own decline.

The migration question is equally poorly handled by the mainstream framing. Merz’s CDU tacked harder on border controls after the 2023 and 2024 elections, then found itself attacked for legitimating AfD frames. But the voters who moved to the AfD on migration were not, in the main, animated by racism in the crude sense; they were animated by the perception — which the data on housing markets, school overcrowding, and municipal social-services budgets consistently support — that large-scale irregular migration created real costs that were borne disproportionately by working-class communities in smaller cities and towns, while being airily dismissed by a progressive commentariat concentrated in Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich. When the centre insists that concerns about integration are simply xenophobia in polite clothing, it does not reassure those voters; it confirms their belief that the mainstream does not listen to them.

NPR’s parallel to Weimar is worth examining honestly. The Weimar Republic did not collapse because Germans were uniquely susceptible to fascism. It collapsed because the political institutions of the republic were unable to deliver stable governance during an economic crisis, and because the middle-class electorate that might have anchored democratic norms had been financially destroyed by hyperinflation and then the Depression. The lesson is not that the AfD is the NSDAP (it is not, whatever its most alarming elements suggest). The lesson is that centre parties that cannot govern effectively — that produce coalition after coalition of mutually hostile partners who spend their term publicly humiliating each other — erode the credibility of democracy itself as a mechanism for solving problems. Germany’s current coalition mathematics are a democratic stress test, not just an inconvenience.

What Merz has to offer — fiscal responsibility, Atlantic solidarity, careful management — is genuinely important. But it is not a compelling narrative for a voter in Saxony whose factory has closed, whose heating bill has doubled, and whose city centre looks nothing like it did fifteen years ago. The centre’s problem is not messaging. It is delivery.

What to watch

Watch whether the CDU can form a workable governing majority without either the AfD’s votes — which would trigger a constitutional crisis in all but name — or a three-party coalition so internally contradictory it cannot pass a budget. Watch Germany’s next set of industrial output figures: if the manufacturing recession deepens through winter, the political pressure on Merz’s government will be immense. Watch the AfD’s handling of any Russia-linked scandal: if a sufficiently dramatic disclosure lands, it could arrest the party’s rise, though recent German history suggests the appetite for accountability has limits. And watch whether Die Linke’s reconstituted left can build a programme capable of genuinely improving the position of eastern German working-class voters — or whether it remains a protest party with no interest in the mechanics of power.

--- J