The United States Supreme Court opens its new October Term on Monday with a docket described by legal analysts as one of the most consequential in a generation. The cases queued for argument include major challenges to the scope of religious exemptions from anti-discrimination law, further Second Amendment litigation defining the post-Bruen landscape for firearms regulation, and a cluster of climate-related cases testing whether state governments can pursue their own emissions standards against federal preemption. The emergency docket — used with increasing frequency by both the Trump administration and its opponents to seek immediate rulings outside the normal briefing calendar — shows no sign of contracting. The Court is simultaneously asked to be the nation’s most powerful policy-making body and its most dispassionate arbiter of constitutional text. It cannot be both.
The received wisdom
Liberal commentary will greet this term with dread and, in some precincts, barely suppressed outrage. The 6-3 conservative supermajority has, in the view of progressive legal scholars, abandoned any pretence of principled restraint and become a judicial arm of the Republican policy agenda. Dobbs ended the constitutional right to abortion. Bruen reshaped gun law. West Virginia v. EPA curtailed the administrative state. Trump v. United States granted broad presidential immunity. Each decision, in this reading, represents not constitutional interpretation but political outcome-seeking dressed in legal robes. The demand on the left is for Court reform — expansion, term limits, a binding code of ethics — and the implicit premise is that the institution has forfeited its legitimacy.
A different read
The left-wing critique contains genuine substance but conflates two different problems: cases where the Court’s conservative majority has reached defensible conclusions through contestable methods, and cases where the reasoning is genuinely strained. Distinguishing between them matters, because the wholesale delegitimisation of the Court is itself a democratic hazard.
Take Bruen, which applied a historical-tradition test to gun regulations. The decision is intellectually serious — it attempts to ground constitutional interpretation in the practices of the founding era rather than in the Court’s own prior doctrine — even if it produces outcomes that progressives find alarming. The complaint that it generates uncertainty for lower courts is valid; but uncertainty in law is not the same as illegitimacy. West Virginia v. EPA similarly reflects a coherent if contestable theory about the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies — a theory that is, in fact, shared by a significant strand of non-conservative administrative law scholarship that worries about regulatory agencies operating without meaningful democratic accountability.
The harder cases are those involving religion. The Court’s expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause — permitting religious employers broader exemptions from civil rights mandates — sits in genuine tension with the Establishment Clause tradition of government neutrality. This is where the charge of motivated reasoning has more bite, because the Court’s conservative wing appears to apply different analytical rigour to religious liberty claims from one direction than another.
What is often missing from the progressive critique is any serious engagement with the institutional alternative. Packing the Court — adding four or six liberal justices — would indeed produce different outcomes in the short run. It would also confirm to every future majority that the Court is simply a legislative chamber with robes, producing the very politicisation that reformers claim to oppose. Term limits are a more defensible reform, supported by majorities across the political spectrum, but they require a constitutional amendment or a statute of uncertain constitutionality — and passing either would require congressional majorities that do not currently exist.
The more honest reckoning is that a 6-3 conservative Court is, for now, the institution Americans have. The question is whether the majority exercises its power with institutional responsibility — avoiding maximalist rulings that go further than the case requires, keeping emergency docket usage tightly disciplined, maintaining genuine procedural consistency across ideological directions. On that criterion, the record of the current majority is mixed. Chief Justice Roberts has shown awareness of the institutional risks; Justices Thomas and Alito rather less so.
The rule of law is not the same as any particular legal outcome. A Court that produces conservative results through consistent, textually grounded reasoning serves the rule of law, even when its outcomes are unpopular. A Court that produces conservative results through outcome-driven reasoning dressed in originalist costume does not. This term will reveal which kind of institution the Roberts Court actually is.
What to watch
- The religious liberty cases: whether the majority writes narrow, case-specific opinions or broad rulings that expand religious exemptions across commercial and employment contexts.
- The climate preemption cases: whether the Court continues to narrow the EPA’s regulatory authority or draws a line at blocking state-level climate regulation entirely.
- Emergency docket discipline: a key signal of institutional health is whether both the Trump administration and its adversaries receive consistent treatment on requests for emergency stays — or whether politics determines the calendar.
- Justice Thomas’s financial disclosure compliance: the ethics dimension has not resolved, and continued questions about undisclosed benefits undermine the Court’s ability to defend its legitimacy on the merits.
— J