Spain's housing crisis and the limits of progressive urbanism

Tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets across Spain on Saturday — from Madrid to Barcelona to Valencia — in what organisers described as the largest coordinated housing demonstration in the country’s modern history. The marches were directed at the socialist-led coalition government of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, which has been in office since 2018 and has repeatedly promised to address a rental and purchase affordability crisis that has made Spain one of the least accessible housing markets in southern Europe. Young Spaniards, in particular, are facing rents that consume 60–70 percent of median income in major cities, with ownership rates among under-35s having collapsed to levels not seen since the 1960s. Analysts are now asking whether the crisis could trigger a snap election.

The received wisdom

The dominant framing is that Spain suffers from underregulation of the rental market, insufficient social housing stock, and the predatory behaviour of large institutional landlords — often foreign-owned real-estate investment trusts — who have bought up urban housing stock and extracted maximum rent from a captive population of young workers. The progressive policy response, already enacted in Catalonia and partially at the national level, is rent control: legally capped increases tied to inflation or below-market indices, alongside taxes on empty properties and restrictions on short-term holiday rentals. The Sánchez government’s 2023 Housing Law was built on exactly this framework. Commentators on the left frame the protesters’ anger as a mandate for more aggressive intervention, not less. The solution, in this telling, is always more regulation.

A different read

The awkward fact — and it is an awkward fact, not a fringe opinion — is that the Spanish housing crisis has deepened, not improved, since the regulatory turn intensified. This is not a coincidence.

Rent controls work as price controls work: they benefit the tenants who hold existing leases (and there are real winners here, primarily older, established residents) at the direct expense of new entrants who find a shrunken supply of available units. Barcelona’s implementation of strict rent caps from 2020 to 2022 — struck down by Spain’s Constitutional Court before being reinstated in modified form — produced exactly the effect economists predicted: a contraction in the number of rental properties listed, as landlords either sold into the ownership market, converted properties to short-term tourist lets (circumventing the cap), or left units empty to avoid regulatory compliance costs. The Guardian reported this week that Spain’s housing problem has become a symbol of progressive governance’s limits — a rare moment of institutional self-examination from a publication not naturally sympathetic to that conclusion.

Meanwhile, Spain’s warming relationship with Beijing — explicitly “to the anger of many in the EU” as the BBC put it — signals a government more focused on geopolitical flexibility than on the structural economic reforms that might actually ease the housing squeeze. The core structural problem is planning: Spain’s urban planning law, rooted in a 1990s framework, makes rezoning agricultural and peripheral land for residential development prohibitively slow and expensive. Countries that have genuinely improved housing affordability — notably Japan, which maintains surprisingly reasonable rents in Tokyo despite massive population density — have done so primarily through liberalised zoning, not rent suppression.

The political beneficiary of this failure is not the left. It is the right-wing Partido Popular and, increasingly, Vox, which has been running on a platform that connects housing unaffordability to migration — a connection that serious economists dispute but that has intuitive resonance for young voters watching wages stagnate while rents rise. The irony is that the progressive coalition built its political identity around housing justice and has delivered the worst housing outcomes in a generation. When the policy fails this visibly, the political space it vacates is filled by movements less committed to liberal democratic norms.

The historical echo is Britain in the 1970s, when rent control and council housing orthodoxy coexisted with a severe housing shortage — a contradiction only resolved by a combination of council house sales (controversial but supply-releasing) and later, partial planning liberalisation. Spain is roughly where Britain was in 1974. The next government — whether PP or a Vox-backed coalition — will inherit the same structural problems and will face the same temptation to blame scapegoats rather than fix zoning law.

What to watch

  • Whether the scale of the protests moves Sánchez toward early elections or toward a further legislative push on rent controls — each path has different implications for Spain’s fiscal and political stability.
  • The Partido Popular’s response at its upcoming autumn conference: if Feijóo endorses supply-side housing reform (liberalised zoning, fast-tracked planning permissions), it will represent a serious policy differentiation rather than mere protest-capture.
  • The EU dimension: Spain’s cosying with China on trade and investment is creating friction in Brussels; a government weakened domestically becomes more dependent on external partners, including non-European ones.
  • Whether the Constitutional Court will again strike down elements of the expanded Housing Law — a legal confrontation that could precipitate a constitutional crisis on top of the political one.

— J