Three years on, accountability deferred again

Three years after the Hamas-led assault of 7 October 2023 — the deadliest attack on Jewish civilians since the Holocaust — Israel held memorial ceremonies across the country. Israelis mourned the approximately 1,200 killed and the hostages still unaccounted for. Yet the political atmosphere surrounding the anniversary is coloured by something the ceremonies themselves cannot resolve: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has still refused to take personal responsibility for the intelligence and military failures that allowed the attack, and has not ordered a formal state inquiry. Protesters demanding accountability gathered outside the Knesset, confronting a government that has treated the commission of inquiry question as an inconvenience to be managed rather than a democratic obligation to be fulfilled.

The received wisdom

The dominant progressive narrative frames the accountability question in terms of Netanyahu’s political survival. He has, the argument runs, every incentive to delay a commission of inquiry because its findings might implicate decisions he took — or failed to take — in the months before October 7. The security establishment had intelligence warnings; the government was distracted by its judicial overhaul. An independent inquiry, on this reading, is simply a truth-telling mechanism that Netanyahu fears for transparently self-interested reasons.

There is real substance to this. The October 7 failures were institutional and political as well as operational. The Agranat Commission established after the Yom Kippur War of 1973 led to the resignations of the chief of staff and the head of military intelligence; it demonstrated that Israeli democracy was capable of holding itself accountable after catastrophic failure. The precedent exists. Netanyahu’s resistance to repeating it is not obviously principled.

A different read

The accountability debate, while legitimate, risks obscuring something more uncomfortable: what a commission of inquiry could actually deliver, and how the pattern of deferral fits within a broader pathology of democratic governments choosing institutional self-protection over institutional reform.

Israel is not alone in this. The United States spent years resisting a serious accounting for the intelligence failures of 11 September 2001, and the eventual 9/11 Commission — while valuable — was systematically hampered by classification disputes, executive privilege claims, and the tendency of any body appointed by politicians to pull its punches on the politicians who appointed it. The UK’s Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War, formally launched in 2009, did not publish its findings until 2016 — twelve years after the invasion it examined.

The historical lesson is not that commissions of inquiry are useless. It is that the same political culture which produces catastrophic failure tends to produce the conditions in which inquiry is minimised, delayed, and ultimately defanged. Netanyahu’s refusal is not an aberration in Western democratic governance; it is, depressingly, close to the norm.

There is also a harder question about what accountability means in the specific Israeli context. The protesters demanding an inquiry are correct that the democratic principle demands it. But inquiry, to be meaningful, must examine the full political context — including the decade of policies that sought to manage Hamas rather than confront it, the division of Palestinian governance between Gaza and the West Bank as a calculated strategy, and the broader strategic framework that treated October 7 as unthinkable. Those were not Netanyahu’s decisions alone.

The risk of personalising accountability — reducing it to a question of whether Netanyahu survives — is that structural failures get laundered through individual culpability. A good inquiry would implicate institutional cultures, military doctrines, and political choices that span multiple governments and intelligence chiefs. That kind of systemic accountability is what Israel actually needs, and it is precisely what makes powerful institutional actors nervous regardless of their political affiliation.

What is most concerning is the precedent the refusal sets. Israel’s resilience as a democracy has historically depended on institutions that could hold themselves to account under extreme pressure. The Agranat Commission after 1973 damaged careers and shattered reputations, but it preserved the legitimacy of the state’s security apparatus. Netanyahu’s refusal to countenance anything similar is not just politically convenient — it is institutionally corrosive, chipping away at the credibility of the security establishment that Israelis must trust to defend them.

The three-year mark matters not as ceremony but as clock. Witnesses age, documents get classified, and political memory fades. Every month the inquiry is deferred is a month in which the factual record of what was known, when, and by whom grows less recoverable. That is precisely the point.

What to watch

  • Whether Netanyahu’s governing coalition — already strained — can survive the anniversary protests or whether the accountability issue becomes a genuine electoral flashpoint ahead of the next Knesset election.
  • The hostage negotiation track: families of those still held have framed the accountability demand as inseparable from the government’s failure to secure releases, which raises the political stakes for the commission question.
  • International pressure: the US and European allies have been conspicuously quiet about the commission demand; watch whether that changes as the anniversary coverage renews public attention.
  • Whether Israel’s Supreme Court, already in conflict with the government over the judicial reform issue, weighs in on the legal obligation to hold an inquiry.

— J