Record Hormuz attacks expose energy order fragility

Reports of attacks on commercial shipping near the Strait of Hormuz have reached a record high, with the BBC reporting that the surge in incidents is causing oil exports through the world’s most important maritime chokepoint to slow measurably. The Strait of Hormuz is the passage through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply transits — some 17 to 18 million barrels per day — making disruption there a direct economic threat to every oil-importing nation on earth. Separately, a drone attack set a tanker ablaze off Romania’s Black Sea coast, leaving seven crew members missing. The two incidents, occurring within days of each other, underscore a pattern: maritime energy infrastructure is under sustained, escalating pressure from multiple vectors simultaneously, in theatres thousands of miles apart.

The received wisdom

The dominant framing from foreign policy analysts and energy security commentators is that the Hormuz pressure is an extension of Iran’s deterrence posture — a calibrated campaign to keep Western powers occupied and to extract concessions from whoever is negotiating with Tehran at any given moment. On this reading, the attacks are economically disruptive but strategically rational: Iran (and its proxies) can threaten the global economy at relatively low cost, creating leverage that compensates for their conventional military inferiority. The West’s response, this argument continues, should be to strengthen naval coalitions, tighten sanctions, and — critically — accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels so that Hormuz gradually loses its stranglehold over global economic life.

This is not a frivolous argument. Iran has demonstrated, repeatedly, that it can inflict disproportionate economic pain relative to the military resources it deploys. The logic of asymmetric deterrence is real.

A different read

But the Hormuz situation is more than an Iranian leverage story, and framing it primarily as a Tehran-Washington negotiating tool obscures the larger structural failure it represents.

First, consider the timeline. The current escalation did not emerge from nowhere. It follows a period in which the Trump administration’s approach to Hormuz has oscillated between maximum pressure and concession, creating precisely the ambiguity that emboldens risk-taking actors. When a great power’s policy is unpredictable, smaller actors rationally probe the boundaries. The record attack levels should not be read as Iranian aggression alone — they are partly a symptom of a strategic environment in which the rules about what triggers a serious Western response have become genuinely unclear.

Second, the Black Sea drone strike against a tanker near Romania’s coast is a different matter entirely. Romania is a NATO member. A burning tanker off its coast, crew missing, is not an Iranian operation — it bears the signature of Russian maritime coercion, the continuation of Moscow’s strategy of using drone warfare to make Ukrainian and Black Sea economic activity unsustainable. Two separate actors, in two separate theatres, are simultaneously targeting the energy infrastructure that underpins Western economic stability. The concurrence is not a coincidence; it reflects an opportunistic logic in which adversaries recognize that Western attention and resources are finite.

Third — and this is the point the transition-to-renewables crowd tends to skip past — the timescales don’t match. Even the most optimistic projections for renewable energy deployment suggest that the global economy will remain substantially dependent on seaborne oil and gas for at least another decade, and probably two. The gap between “we should decarbonise” and “therefore Hormuz security is yesterday’s problem” is enormous. In that gap, real ships burn, real crew members drown, and real economies contract. A responsible energy policy has to manage the transition without assuming the current system can be wished away on an activist’s preferred schedule.

The historical parallel that comes to mind is the 1980s tanker war, when Iraq and Iran both attacked neutral shipping in the Gulf in an attempt to economically strangle each other. The Reagan administration eventually deployed the US Navy to escort Kuwaiti tankers under American flags — Operation Earnest Will — because the costs of inaction were simply too high. The principle holds today: when critical global infrastructure comes under sustained attack, the response cannot be limited to diplomatic notes and sanctions reviews. It requires actual naval presence and credible deterrence. Whether the current administration has the appetite for that kind of sustained commitment remains, charitably, an open question.

What to watch

Watch whether oil prices continue to rise — any sustained move above $90 per barrel will start showing up in inflation figures at a moment when both the US and UK are already fighting above-target price growth. Watch whether the NATO response to the Black Sea tanker attack amounts to anything beyond a statement; the absence of a meaningful response would itself be a data point about Western credibility. And watch whether any formal naval coalition is reconstituted for Hormuz operations, or whether the current situation — record attacks, slowing exports, no unified Western response — simply becomes the new normal.

— J