Brazil's runoff exposes the left's legitimacy problem

Brazil is heading into the decisive stretch of its presidential runoff in a condition that would have seemed improbable two years ago: the latest polling shows Jair Bolsonaro maintaining an edge over incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. This comes against a backdrop of what should be easy progressive wins: Brazilian Amazon deforestation has fallen to its lowest level on record, a genuine environmental achievement that Lula’s government rightly claims credit for. Yet that achievement — celebrated internationally, quantified precisely, endorsed by scientists — has not translated into a polling lead for an incumbent who should, on any simple model, be benefiting from it. Meanwhile, Lula himself has made a startling pivot: the president says he now backs lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 16, a position associated with the Brazilian right that he spent his 2022 campaign opposing. The political desperation implicit in that move tells the story of a government in electoral trouble.

The received wisdom

The dominant progressive framing is that Bolsonaro’s persistence represents a failure of Brazilian democracy — a country being tempted back toward the strongman politics that led to the January 8 riots, the assault on democratic institutions, and four years of anti-science governance that included the world’s worst COVID mismanagement by any democracy. On this reading, Lula’s problems are primarily problems of media bias, social media disinformation, and a judiciary that has not moved fast enough to hold Bolsonaro accountable for inciting the 2022 Capitol-style violence. The corrective, on this analysis, is more robust democratic defence and better progressive messaging.

The international consensus around Brazilian environmentalism reinforces this frame: deforestation at record lows is an objective fact that a functioning democracy should reward. The fact that it has not produced a polling lead is, for many analysts, evidence that Brazilian voters are being manipulated rather than exercising informed judgment.

A different read

That reading is not wrong, but it is self-flattering in ways that prevent the Brazilian left from understanding its actual problem.

Begin with the deforestation figures. The record low is real and significant. But it represents a return to approximately the enforcement levels of Lula’s own previous terms — it is the restoration of a baseline, not the creation of something new. In the interior of the country, among farming communities and small-town Brazilians, the enforcement regime that produces the deforestation figures feels like an economic constraint, a foreign-pressured imposition, a cosmopolitan priority imposed on people whose livelihoods depend on land use. Lula’s polling numbers in rural Brazil are not a failure of information; they are a response to a genuine policy trade-off that his government has consistently underweighted in its political calculations.

The criminal responsibility pivot is more revealing still. Lula’s reversal is an explicit admission that his government has not convinced a majority of Brazilians that it can deliver public safety. Crime, violence, and the perception of impunity are the issues that Bolsonaro has consistently won on, not because Brazilians are fascists or dupes, but because urban and peri-urban violence is a real daily experience for millions of ordinary Brazilians that no amount of deforestation data makes less frightening. Lula’s late conversion to the tougher-on-crime position may buy some votes at the margin, but it undermines the coherence of a left-wing political project that had insisted such positions were unnecessary and retrograde.

There is a broader pattern here that transcends Brazil. Across Western and developing democracies, left-of-centre governments that have prioritised international progressive priorities — climate, multilateralism, minority rights — over the everyday security, affordability, and order concerns of their median voter have found themselves in electoral difficulty. This is not because voters are wrong or misinformed; it is because the left has, in various countries, allowed the preferences of its activist class to crowd out the concerns of the working and lower-middle class voters on whom it depends. Brazil’s Lula, like several European social-democratic leaders before him, is discovering this in real time, with the election clock running.

The historical parallel is France under Hollande: a Socialist president who achieved genuine policy successes in some domains, was celebrated internationally, and was crushed domestically by his inability to speak to the quotidian anxieties of French voters about security and economic stagnation. Whether Lula can recalibrate quickly enough is the question. The pivot on criminal responsibility suggests he is trying; whether it is too late, too transparent, or simply too much at odds with his own political identity to be credible is the gamble.

What to watch

Watch the final week of campaigning for whether Lula doubles down on the security pivot or retreats to his environmental and social justice base — both choices carry significant risks. Watch whether the Bolsonaro camp manages to keep its candidate’s legal vulnerabilities out of the dominant frame for the remaining campaign, since his criminal and January 8 exposure remains the most significant thing standing between him and the presidency. And watch the turnout models: Brazil has mandatory voting, but enthusiasm differentials can still affect the result, and Lula’s ability to mobilise low-income urban voters — his historical base — may ultimately matter more than any last-minute policy pivot.

— J