Europe steps up as Trump pivots on Ukraine

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived at an EU summit in Brussels this week carrying an unusually blunt message: the United States is no longer a reliable partner for his country’s survival. At the heart of his complaint is a two-front squeeze. First, reports emerged that Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network had its military-grade Starshield access restricted, disrupting Ukrainian battlefield coordination — disruptions the Guardian reports Zelenskyy says have still not been fully resolved. Second, and more strategically alarming, the Trump administration has handed Moscow a diesel fuel deal even as Ukraine continues pressing forward in occupied Donetsk. Trump himself denied restricting Starlink access, but European allies are not waiting for clarification. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the summit that EU support for Ukraine “matters more than ever” and that European resolve must fill the gap Washington is leaving behind. Italy’s defence minister went further, telling the BBC that Trump was “completely wrong” to restrict support for Ukraine.

The received wisdom

The conventional reading — dominant across European capitals and the centre-left commentary class — is that Trump is abandoning a democratic ally to appease an authoritarian aggressor, and that the only corrective is for Europe to dramatically increase its own defence spending and fill the gap. On this reading, Zelenskyy’s Brussels visit is a watershed moment: the democratic world finally waking up to the fact that American security guarantees are transactional at best and negotiable at worst. NATO’s credibility, this argument runs, depends entirely on whether its biggest member can be counted on when the stakes are real.

This narrative has considerable force. The diesel deal in particular is hard to defend on any strategic calculus. Russia’s military machine runs on diesel. Supplying it — or at least not obstructing its supply chains — while Ukrainian soldiers die on the Donetsk plain sends an unmistakable signal about whose long-term interests Washington is prioritising. Even many conservatives who accept Trump’s broader scepticism about blank-cheque foreign aid have struggled to explain away this one.

A different read

And yet the picture is more complicated than a simple tale of American abandonment, and European triumphalism about “stepping up” deserves the scepticism it has so far largely escaped.

Begin with the Starlink question. Musk’s satellite internet has been nothing short of revolutionary on the Ukrainian battlefield — one BBC investigation found it plays a “key role” in coordinating Ukrainian offensives. But the dependence it represents is precisely the problem. A sovereign nation’s military capability should not rest on the goodwill of a private billionaire who has other business interests, a mercurial political relationship with the sitting president, and no treaty obligation to Ukraine. This is not a failure of Trump policy alone; it is a structural vulnerability that European and Ukrainian planners allowed to develop unchecked for years when the alternative — building sovereign or at least multi-nation satellite communications capacity — was available but expensive and unglamorous.

On the diesel deal: the details remain opaque, and opacity is itself informative. We do not know whether this is a genuine concession to Moscow, a back-channel pressure tool, or simply chaotic improvisation from an administration that has never produced a coherent Russia strategy. All three possibilities are consistent with the publicly available evidence. Commentators who reached immediately for the “betrayal” frame are importing a certainty the facts do not support.

What is clearer is the European response — and here the irony bites. Von der Leyen’s declaration that EU support “matters more than ever” is admirable as rhetoric, but Europe has been saying some version of this since February 2022. The gap between European declarations of resolve and European defence spending has been one of the defining features of the post-Cold War era. Germany still has not hit 2% of GDP in sustained, reliable military procurement. France’s force projection capability remains impressive by European standards but modest by global ones. The European Defence Fund is a fraction of what serious continental deterrence would require.

There is also a historical parallel worth dwelling on. American ambivalence about European commitments is not a Trump invention. The burden-sharing argument stretches back through Obama’s famous private description of European allies as “free riders,” through the Bush-era ruptures over Iraq, to the Nixon administration’s threats to reduce troops in Germany unless Bonn paid more. What changes with Trump is the register — louder, cruder, more personalist — but the underlying strategic logic of an America that sees its European commitment as a negotiated arrangement rather than a sacred obligation is older than most of the analysts currently expressing shock about it.

The most uncomfortable question for European audiences is this: if the EU had taken defence seriously for the past decade, would Zelenskyy’s position be this precarious? The honest answer is probably no. Russia’s sustained attacks on Ukrainian power plants suggest Moscow has decided it cannot win militarily and is trying to make Ukrainian cities uninhabitable instead — a strategy that requires patience and Western exhaustion, both of which are now in much larger supply than they were two years ago.

What to watch

Watch whether any EU member state moves beyond rhetoric to fast-track Ukrainian Starshield alternatives or EU-sovereign satellite capacity — that would be the real test of resolve. Monitor the diesel deal: if details emerge that it is time-limited or conditioned on Russian behaviour, the calculus changes. Watch the midterm map: the biggest variable affecting US Ukraine policy before January is not Trump himself but whether Republicans hold or lose seats in the House, which will determine whether Congress can constrain or accelerate White House dealmaking with Moscow.

— J