Trump's sanctions waiver rewards Putin's patience

President Donald Trump signed an executive order on October 17 waiving several Russia-related sanctions that had been imposed in the wake of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The decision drew immediate criticism from Kyiv, with President Volodymyr Zelensky calling it a “reward” for Vladimir Putin and urging the United States to maintain maximum economic pressure. The waiver, which covers certain energy and financial sector penalties, follows weeks of tension over American support for Ukraine and comes amid reports that Trump’s team has been engaged in backchannel discussions with Moscow. Bipartisan critics in Congress warned that relaxing sanctions without any verified Russian concession undermines the entire leverage structure that Washington spent four years constructing.

The received wisdom

The standard progressive and centrist defence of Trump’s move goes something like this: sanctions are a blunt instrument that hurt ordinary Russians rather than their rulers, and after four years they have demonstrably failed to change the Kremlin’s calculus. The war grinds on; the Russian economy has adapted through workarounds with China, India, and the Gulf states; and the only way to end a conflict is through negotiation, not economic warfare. Continued maximalism, this argument runs, simply prolongs Ukrainian suffering. There is a realist school, associated loosely with thinkers like John Mearsheimer, that goes further: that NATO expansion provoked the war and that Western stubbornness is preventing a deal that Ukraine would have to accept eventually anyway. On this reading, an American president cutting leverage to start a conversation is not appeasement but pragmatism.

A different read

The problem with this framing is that it conflates the existence of negotiations with the existence of a credible negotiating position. Sanctions are not valuable because they change Putin’s mind in real time. They are valuable because they are the currency with which you purchase Russian concessions at the table. Waiving them before sitting down is the diplomatic equivalent of folding before the river card is dealt.

The history here is instructive. The Obama administration’s 2012 “reset” with Russia, celebrated at the time as sophisticated de-escalation, was followed within two years by the annexation of Crimea. The 2015 Minsk II agreement — negotiated under Hollande and Merkel with Russian assurances — was later admitted by key signatories to have been used by Kyiv primarily as a breathing space to rearm, and by Russia as a template for recognising that the West’s appetite for confrontation was limited. Each time Moscow tested and found forbearance, it calibrated the next escalation accordingly.

Trump’s defenders will argue that this time is different: that he alone has the credibility with Moscow to produce a deal, that European allies are too timid to get there, and that Ukrainian intransigence is prolonging unnecessary bloodshed. There is a grain of truth in the first claim — Trump’s unpredictability genuinely unsettles the Kremlin’s scenario planners in ways that Blinken’s careful multilateralism never did. But unpredictability only functions as leverage if the adversary cannot identify a clear directional drift. And the directional drift is becoming unmistakeable. The diesel concessions, the Starlink restrictions on Ukrainian operations, and now the formal sanctions waiver form a sequence that a patient strategist in Moscow can read as a coherent American retreat.

The “bipartisan backlash” label attached to congressional criticism is worth examining carefully. It is not merely liberal Democrats outraged on principle. Republican senators with serious foreign policy credentials — voices who have sat on Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees for decades — are warning that this erodes the entire architecture of economic statecraft that the United States has spent two generations building. When allies in Warsaw, Tallinn, and Vilnius watch Washington waive sanctions against the country whose forces have parked tanks on the doorstep of NATO’s eastern flank, they draw conclusions about the credibility of Article 5 commitments that no summit communiqué can fully walk back.

The deeper issue is structural. The executive branch under modern American law has enormous unilateral authority over sanctions — authority that was granted during the Cold War era on the assumption that it would be used to increase pressure on adversaries, not to relieve it. Trump is exposing an institutional gap: there is no mechanism forcing the president to tie sanctions relief to verified, enforceable Russian concessions. Congress can pass resolutions, hold hearings, and issue stern statements, but absent new legislation — which faces its own political obstacles in an election season — the president can continue to deconstruct the sanctions architecture piece by piece, leaving successors with a depleted toolkit and no precedent for rebuilding it quickly.

The moral dimension matters too, even for conservatives who are sceptical of humanitarian interventionism. Ukraine did not ask for this war. Its people have fought with extraordinary courage and at appalling cost against an adversary that explicitly denies their national existence. Whatever one thinks of Zelensky’s political tactics or the governance deficiencies Kyiv must address, granting Moscow a financial dividend while Ukrainian children are being killed by glide bombs is a statement about American values that will be read in Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang just as carefully as it is read in Kyiv.

What to watch

Four signals will tell us whether this is a tactical concession or a strategic capitulation. First, watch whether the waiver is time-limited and conditioned — the White House has been vague on both. Second, watch European responses: if Macron or Scholz scramble to coordinate a substitute sanctions package, it suggests they regard the American move as a genuine break rather than a blip. Third, watch Russian behaviour on the battlefield in the next thirty days: historic precedent suggests Moscow intensifies operations when it senses Western will wavering. Fourth, watch the midterm Senate races: several Republicans in competitive states have broken publicly with Trump on this, and the electoral consequences for their apostasy will tell us how much latitude the president has for further concessions.

— J