Albania's sixth day and democracy's hollow shell

Albania entered its sixth consecutive day of violent anti-government protests on Sunday, with demonstrators in Tirana setting fire to the Supreme Court building as Prime Minister Edi Rama refused to resign. Police responded with water cannons and tear gas in scenes broadcast across European news networks. The protests, which began as a student demonstration against rising living costs and government corruption, have escalated into a direct confrontation with state authority, with crowds attempting to storm government buildings in the capital. Al Jazeera documented protesters clashing with riot police outside parliament, while the BBC reported that the unrest has spread to secondary cities. The European Union, which is currently reviewing Albania’s accession candidacy, issued a statement calling for restraint on both sides.

The received wisdom

The dominant framing is one of democratic breakthrough struggling against entrenched corruption. Mainstream commentary presents Prime Minister Rama — a former artist and long-serving Socialist Party leader — as an autocrat who has used electoral victories to consolidate personal power, undermine judicial independence, and capture state media. The protesters, in this reading, are the vanguard of a genuine civil society demanding the rule of law that EU membership is supposed to guarantee. The Brussels perspective reinforces this: Albania’s accession process has repeatedly been stalled precisely because reforms on the judiciary and anti-corruption mechanisms have been more procedural than substantive. The BBC’s reporting frames the unrest in this register — legitimate frustration with a government that won elections without winning accountability. The prescription from this camp is clear: Rama should negotiate, accelerate judicial reform, and the EU should use the accession lever more forcefully as a conditionality mechanism.

This framing is not wrong. Rama has been in power since 2013, his government has a documented record of judicial interference, and the gap between Albania’s formal institutional architecture and its lived political reality is substantial. Dismissing the protesters as destabilising agents would be both unfair and empirically inaccurate.

A different read

But the received wisdom carries a silent assumption worth interrogating: that the EU accession process is, in principle, the right mechanism for building democratic institutions, and that its failures in Albania are implementation errors rather than structural ones.

The evidence increasingly suggests the opposite. EU enlargement in the Western Balkans has produced a specific and recognisable pathology: governments that are adept at generating the formal paperwork of democratic reform — constitutions, anti-corruption agencies, independent prosecutor statutes — while retaining the substance of clientelist control. Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and now Albania have all followed variants of this trajectory. The European Commission’s annual progress reports document the gap in increasingly frank language, but the process grinds on, because the alternative — admitting that enlargement conditionality cannot deliver democratic transformation in societies where the informal networks of power predate and outlast any constitutional text — is politically unacceptable in Brussels.

This is not a counsel of Balkan despair. It is an observation about institutional design. Francis Fukuyama’s work on state capacity, particularly in Political Order and Political Decay, argues that political development requires the sequential construction of a capable state, the rule of law, and democratic accountability — and that democracy imposed on a state without the prior two components tends to produce electoral authoritarianism rather than liberal governance. Albania is a near-perfect illustration. Rama wins elections; he simply does not govern through institutions he does not control.

The burning of the Supreme Court is, on this analysis, not merely anti-Rama but anti-institutional — a symptom of a society that has been told for three decades that formal institutions are the solution, while watching those institutions serve as facades for informal power. When every anti-corruption body is captured, every court packed, every independent agency subordinated, the distinction between the institution and the person running it collapses in popular perception. The protesters are not wrong to see the Supreme Court as a symbol of the problem rather than its remedy.

Historically, the comparison that comes most naturally is not 1989 — the romantic template of democratic transition that European discourse still gravitates toward — but the colour revolutions of the 2000s: moments of genuine popular mobilisation that produced government change without institutional deepening, because the preconditions for institutional deepening were absent. Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan repeatedly: the new governments were more palatable to Western observers but no more institutionally stable. Albania risks a similar cycle — Rama falls, a successor inherits the same informal networks, and the process restarts.

The EU’s response matters. If Brussels treats this as an opportunity to extract faster formal concessions from whoever succeeds Rama, it will produce another cycle. What Albania actually needs is a decade-long programme of patient state-capacity building focused on civil service professionalism, judicial salaries, and prosecutorial independence from political appointment — unglamorous work that the enlargement process has consistently subordinated to the headline-generating milestones of screening chapters and opening negotiations.

What to watch

  • Whether Rama attempts to declare a state of emergency, which would give the EU a clearer conditionality trigger.
  • The response of Albania’s opposition parties, who have a history of boycotting parliament rather than building coalitions — a symptom of the same institutional deficit the protesters are reacting against.
  • Whether the EU Commissioner for Enlargement makes an emergency visit, and whether that visit produces substance or ceremony.
  • The spillover effects into Kosovo and North Macedonia, where similar combinations of economic stress and institutional distrust are present.

— J