Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has won a fourth presidential term in Brazil, defeating Flávio Bolsonaro — son of the former president — in a runoff election that was, by most accounts, far closer than polling had suggested. BBC News reports that Lula’s victory came after a dramatic late swing, with celebrations erupting in São Paulo and other major cities. Flávio Bolsonaro has refused to concede and called for the results to be annulled, a posture grimly familiar from his father’s 2022 playbook. Meanwhile, Al Jazeera reports that the Brazilian real sank on currency markets in the immediate aftermath — a verdict from financial traders that carries its own political weight.
The received wisdom
The dominant frame in international media is one of democratic triumph: a charismatic left-wing leader defeating the heir of an authoritarian populist movement, with street parties as the backdrop. Guardian coverage speaks of Lula’s “historic comeback” and emphasises the role of grassroots WhatsApp organising and social media in driving turnout. The narrative is broadly one of liberal democracy reasserting itself over right-wing revanchism, and many Western commentators have welcomed the result as a rebuke to the global authoritarian tide. There is something to this: the Bolsonaro family’s disdain for institutional constraints was real, and its electoral defeat is not nothing. A country of 215 million people that holds a competitive election, however messy, is doing something right.
A different read
The problem with the triumph narrative is that it papers over the considerable anxieties the result ought to generate — including for those who genuinely care about Brazil’s long-term stability.
Start with the markets. The real’s immediate depreciation after Lula’s win is not merely a reactionary tic by plutocratic traders. Brazil has been here before. Lula’s first three terms — stretching across much of the 2000s and early 2010s — combined genuine poverty reduction under the Bolsa Família programme with fiscal management that ranged from the tolerable to the reckless. His third term, beginning in 2023, was marked almost immediately by market turbulence over proposed changes to the fiscal framework, as investors fretted about spending commitments that could undermine the spending cap his predecessor Bolsonaro had, to his credit, maintained. A fourth term, with Lula’s coalition now dominant and the Bolsonarist opposition in disarray, removes much of the political constraint that might have held expenditure in check.
Second, consider the democratic institutions question from the other direction. The Bolsonarist refusal to accept the result is concerning — but the question of why roughly half the Brazilian electorate voted for a candidate associated with democratic backsliding deserves a more searching answer than “they were deceived.” Brazil’s institutions are imperfect in ways that predate Bolsonaro. Lula himself was imprisoned on corruption charges — charges that were later thrown out on procedural grounds by a Supreme Court that his allies have consistently sought to pack. The rule of law in Brazil is not a fixed star that progressive electoral victories reliably protect; it is a contested terrain. As the historian Niall Ferguson has noted in analogous contexts, the health of democratic institutions depends less on who wins elections than on whether the winners submit themselves to the same constraints they applied to the losers.
Third, the WhatsApp campaign that reportedly helped turn the election for Lula — described in detail by BBC analysis — raises its own questions. A political operation that organises through encrypted group chats to drive emotional mobilisation is not inherently more legitimate than one that uses Facebook or TV advertising. It is simply more legible to journalists who share the organisers’ politics.
None of this is an argument that Bolsonaro’s son would have been preferable. The case against that dynasty is strong and well-established. But the case for Lula should rest on something more durable than the defeat of someone worse. Brazil’s structural problems — fiscal pressures, institutional fragility, a commodity-dependent economy vulnerable to global shocks — have not been resolved by this election result. They have merely been assigned to a new steward.
The real’s fall tells you something. Markets can be wrong, and often are. But when the currency moves against a winner on election night, it is worth asking what signal is being sent, and whether the celebration is getting in the way of hearing it.
What to watch
- Fiscal framework negotiations in the first 100 days: whether Lula’s government submits credible medium-term spending plans or begins to unpick the existing cap will be the most important early indicator.
- Flávio Bolsonaro’s legal situation: he has been ordered to surrender his passport. Whether that order is enforced — and how the courts handle challenges from his movement — will test institutional resilience.
- The real’s trajectory: sustained depreciation would constrain social spending and fuel inflation, creating precisely the conditions that tend to generate the kind of discontent that fed Bolsonarism in the first place.
- US policy response: the Biden-era playbook of quiet Democratic solidarity with Latin American left governments may not survive a Republican-controlled Congress.
— J