With 85 percent of ballots counted in Israel’s general election, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and its right-wing allies appear to have won approximately 53 seats in the 120-seat Knesset — short of the 61 needed for a governing majority. The result, reported early Thursday morning, is close enough that all four outcomes analysts had predicted remain technically possible: a Netanyahu-led government cobbled together with smaller factions, a broad anti-Netanyahu coalition, a unity government of necessity, or — most likely if none of these prove workable — a return to the polls for what would be Israel’s sixth election in roughly five years. Turnout was high, suggesting genuine public engagement rather than fatigue-driven abstention. The vote is the first since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel and the subsequent military campaign in Gaza — the shadow over every ballot cast.
The received wisdom
The mainstream liberal reading of this result is broadly hopeful. A Netanyahu bloc that falls short of a majority is presented as evidence that Israeli voters, even amid ongoing conflict, have not definitively endorsed the maximalist security-first politics that Netanyahu embodies. The argument is that war tends to entrench incumbents — and that Netanyahu’s failure to clear the majority threshold, despite deploying every incumbent advantage, suggests voters retain an appetite for accountability. The question of what happened on October 7, who was responsible for the intelligence and security failures, and what Gaza’s future looks like under a post-Netanyahu government: these are framed as the live democratic debates that a new coalition could finally address. Some commentators go further, suggesting a Netanyahu defeat would create space for a negotiated end to the Gaza campaign and an eventual two-state pathway.
This reading is not entirely wrong. Netanyahu’s personal legal situation — ongoing corruption trials — has been a persistent political liability, and many Israeli voters clearly want to separate that question from the security questions that have dominated the campaign.
A different read
The hopeful framing, however, runs ahead of the evidence. An Israeli polity that produces 53 seats for the Netanyahu bloc in the aftermath of the most catastrophic intelligence failure in the state’s history is not a society in the early stages of liberal democratic renewal. It is a society where, for a substantial plurality, the existential security frame remains dominant — and where the argument that Netanyahu bears personal responsibility for October 7’s failures simply has not proven electorally decisive.
The more unsettling conclusion is that the election’s result is nearly irrelevant to the actual questions that matter most. Israel faces three interlocking strategic problems that no coalition arithmetic resolves. First, what does a post-war Gaza look like, and who governs it? No mainstream Israeli political formation has a credible answer. The options — reoccupation, international administration, a reconstituted Palestinian Authority, a technocratic interim body — are each deeply problematic, and the military campaign has made the political space for any of them considerably narrower. Second, what is Israel’s long-term relationship with its Arab neighbours given the events of the past three years? The Abraham Accords framework — already under severe strain since October 7 — depends on a kind of pragmatic normalisation that is now politically much harder to sustain in Riyadh, Amman, and Abu Dhabi alike. Third, who rebuilds Gaza, at what cost, and on what conditions?
None of these questions yield to a change of prime minister. They are structural — a function of geography, demography, regional politics, and the specific catastrophe of October 7 — and they will confront whichever coalition emerges from the coalition negotiations, which are likely to be protracted and may fail entirely. Israel’s parliamentary system, with its low threshold for party entry and its tradition of fractious coalition politics, is designed for normal democratic pluralism; it is poorly suited to resolving questions of this magnitude. This is not a new observation — analysts from Yohanan Plessner to Dan Meridor have spent years arguing that Israel’s electoral architecture is a source of structural instability — but the current moment makes the gap between the demands placed on the political system and the system’s actual capacity unusually vivid.
The historical parallel worth holding in mind is Weimar Germany, but not in the sensationalist way that parallel is usually invoked. Weimar’s lesson was not that fractious democracies produce fascism as a matter of logic. The lesson was subtler: that parliamentary arithmetic can become an obstacle to governing at exactly the moment when governing is most urgent — and that when the gap between crisis severity and political capacity becomes sufficiently wide, voters eventually stop trusting the mechanism itself. Israel is not Weimar. But a sixth election in five years, against the backdrop of an unresolved military campaign and ongoing hostage crisis, would test the resilience of any democratic culture.
What to watch
The immediate watch is the coalition negotiation process: whether President Herzog gives the mandate to Netanyahu or to an alternative leader, and which smaller parties prove decisive. Itamar Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism are the fulcrum — their demands regarding Gaza and West Bank policy will set the terms of any right-wing coalition.
Secondly, the fate of the remaining hostages. Any coalition deal will face immediate pressure on hostage negotiations, and the gap between what Hamas will accept and what the Israeli right is willing to concede has not narrowed.
Third, Washington’s posture. The current U.S. administration has been more permissive of Israeli military operations than its predecessor; a Netanyahu coalition’s composition will signal how much daylight, if any, opens between Jerusalem and Washington.
Finally, whether the International Criminal Court arrest warrant process — already significantly damaging Netanyahu internationally — becomes a domestic political issue in Israel in new ways under a post-election government.
--- J