Putin courts Africa and the West concedes the stage

Vladimir Putin addressed dozens of African heads of state and government on Wednesday at the third Russia-Africa Summit, delivering a speech that framed Moscow as the continent’s natural partner against Western neo-colonialism. Russia would not pursue “neo-colonialism” in Africa, Putin declared, contrasting Moscow’s approach with that of the “colonial” West. The summit, held amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the continued deployment of Wagner-successor mercenaries across the Sahel and Central African Republic, drew governments from across the continent — though the number of heads of state attending was lower than the 2023 gathering, suggesting some African capitals are beginning to calculate the reputational costs of close association with Moscow. Separately, Putin described Elon Musk as a “real genius” following satellite talks with the SpaceX and Tesla CEO — a pairing that has raised eyebrows in Western capitals about the access being granted to a businessman who operates critical communications infrastructure.

The received wisdom

The liberal-internationalist reading of Putin’s Africa performance is essentially dismissive: this is crude propaganda from a country whose African engagement consists largely of mercenaries, disinformation, and arms sales. The Wagner/Africa Corps operation in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the CAR has left trails of documented atrocities. Russian grain diplomacy is transactional and coercive. The anti-colonial framing is especially brazen given that Russia is currently engaged in an imperial land war against a neighbouring sovereign state. On this reading, African leaders who appear on stage with Putin are either pragmatists maximising external patrons, leaders insulated from democratic accountability, or both — and the West should simply out-resource and out-message them.

This reading is not without merit. The historical record of Russian engagement in Africa — from Soviet-era proxy conflicts to the post-2014 mercenary deployments — is genuinely predatory, and the gap between Putin’s rhetorical anti-colonialism and Russia’s actual conduct is vast and documentable.

A different read

The dismissive framing, however, produces exactly the kind of policy complacency that allows Russian influence to deepen. The question is not whether Putin’s anti-colonial narrative is cynical — it manifestly is — but why it has traction, and what that traction tells us about Western failure.

The uncomfortable answer is that Western engagement with Africa has its own substantial credibility deficit, and that deficit is not primarily a communications problem. France’s decades-long Françafrique network — the system of opaque political and business relationships between Paris and Francophone African elites — was the kind of neo-colonialism that did not need inverted commas. Britain’s colonial record in eastern and southern Africa, now under partial scrutiny as King Charles tours the Caribbean and acknowledges “suffering of the past”, shaped the economic structures that African states inherited at independence and still navigate. When Putin stands before African leaders and says “the West is colonial,” he is not inventing the history — he is exploiting it. The exploitation is cynical precisely because Russia’s own record in Africa is what it is. But exploitation requires a real wound.

The strategic picture is equally sobering. The Sahel’s turn away from French forces and toward Wagner-successor groups did not happen because Russian propaganda is more sophisticated than French messaging. It happened because French counter-insurgency operations were producing civilian casualties, because a generation of political elites found that Moscow’s support was less conditional on governance reforms than Paris’s support was, and because the democratic accountability mechanisms that Western partners demanded were, in the eyes of these governments, luxury constraints. Moscow frames itself as African nations’ best partner not primarily by outspending the West — Russia has limited capacity to do that — but by offering fewer conditions.

There is a genuine policy question here about conditionality. Western aid and security partnerships have generally been more conditional on governance, transparency, and human rights than Russian or Chinese alternatives. There are good reasons for those conditions, but imposing them without adequate investment in why they are worth bearing, and without genuinely sharing the benefits of meeting them, has created an opening that adversarial powers have exploited. The EU’s Global Gateway and the US’s Lobito Corridor infrastructure investment are the right instincts — but they are years behind the Chinese Belt and Road presence, and still early in delivery.

The Musk dimension of the summit deserves its own reckoning. Putin’s praise for Musk, and the reported satellite discussions, sit in deeply uncomfortable proximity to Musk’s control over Starlink infrastructure that is operationally critical for Ukrainian forces. Any suggestion of a channel between Musk and Moscow — however indirect — has implications that go well beyond the Africa summit, and Western governments would be right to seek clarity about the nature and content of those conversations.

What to watch

The lower African head-of-state attendance at this summit compared to 2023 is a real signal worth tracking. If the pattern continues at the next summit, it suggests that the costs of close Russian association are being recalculated in a growing number of capitals.

French Africa policy will be the most important variable to watch. With France having withdrawn forces from Mali and Niger, and facing mounting domestic pressure on its remaining African commitments, the vacuum is real. How Paris responds — and whether it can reframe its engagement on terms that African governments can actually accept — is the critical policy question.

The Musk-Putin relationship warrants formal congressional scrutiny. Whether informal communications between SpaceX’s CEO and Russian officials constitute a conflict of interest for a company running infrastructure that Allied forces depend upon is not a hypothetical.

Finally, Tanzania’s natural gas discovery announced this week — the first in over a decade — is a reminder that Africa’s energy resources are a live strategic prize. Who finances and develops that gas matters enormously for the continent’s twenty-first-century trajectory.

--- J