The United States Supreme Court heard arguments Tuesday in a case that pits Colorado’s universal pre-K programme against a Catholic preschool’s claim that anti-discrimination requirements — specifically, provisions barring exclusion of LGBTQ families — violate its religious freedom. NPR reported that the Court appeared to lean toward the school’s position, with several justices signalling sympathy for the argument that a religious institution cannot be compelled to accept state funding conditions that require it to act contrary to its sincere beliefs. The case arises under Colorado’s pre-K programme, which is publicly funded and universally available but which the state had extended to religious schools on the condition of compliance with its anti-discrimination rules. The school argues that these conditions effectively force a choice between participating in a public benefit programme and maintaining its religious character — a form of coercion that, it contends, the First Amendment forbids. The case is the latest in a series of Supreme Court rulings that have progressively expanded the scope of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.
The received wisdom
The progressive legal consensus views this line of cases with mounting alarm. Since Fulton v. Philadelphia (2021) and 303 Creative (2023), a conservative Court majority has repeatedly found in favour of religious exemption claims, in ways that critics argue are dismantling the anti-discrimination framework built over decades. The concern is structural: if religious institutions can opt out of anti-discrimination requirements while still receiving public funding, the state becomes, in effect, a subsidiser of discrimination. Children from LGBTQ families would be denied access to publicly funded education not because of anything they have done, but because of who their parents are. The progressive argument is that religious freedom is not a licence to harm others, and that the harm to excluded children is concrete and measurable, while the harm to a religious school required to serve all families is at most a matter of institutional discomfort rather than genuine religious injury.
A different read
The progressive framing is coherent, but it rests on a contestable premise: that religious schools participating in public programmes have thereby surrendered their institutional character. The alternative view — which has deep roots in American constitutional tradition — is that pluralism is best served not by requiring all institutions to conform to a single public standard, but by maintaining a thick diversity of institutions, each governed by its own norms, which families can choose among.
The pre-K funding question turns on what conditions the state may attach to public benefits. The Supreme Court’s unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the government cannot coerce individuals or institutions into surrendering constitutional rights as a price of receiving a benefit they would otherwise be entitled to. If a religious school meets every criterion for the programme except willingness to abandon its religious hiring and admission practices, conditioning its exclusion on that basis is constitutionally suspect — not because discrimination is fine, but because the First Amendment’s religion clauses protect institutional religious autonomy, not just individual belief.
The deeper philosophical question is about the nature of pluralism itself. The liberal state’s anti-discrimination architecture reflects a genuine moral achievement: the principle that civic participation should not depend on membership in the majority group. But it was built in a context where the primary threat to that principle came from institutions wielding majoritarian power against minorities. The religious liberty cases present the inverse scenario: a majoritarian state wielding anti-discrimination requirements against minority religious communities whose practices differ from the emerging secular consensus. Both are real concerns. The question is which institutional configuration best protects a plural society.
Nina Totenberg’s NPR reporting noted the justices’ questioning suggested sympathy for the school’s position. If the Court rules broadly, the practical consequence may be less dramatic than either side claims: families with LGBTQ parents would simply not receive their pre-K subsidy through this particular school. Colorado has secular alternatives. The harm is real but limited. A narrower ruling — applying only to overtly religious instructional content, for instance — would be more defensible as a legal matter and more honest about where the genuine conflict lies.
The more interesting long-term question is whether the progressive anti-discrimination project, which began as a protection for racial minorities against majority institutions, can be sustained as a universal framework as the moral consensus on sexual ethics continues to diversify. The countries that have best managed religious pluralism — the Netherlands, Canada before recent culture war intensification — have generally done so through accommodation and opt-outs rather than through enforced conformity. That is not a surrender to bigotry; it is a recognition that a plural society requires plural institutions.
What to watch
Watch the breadth of the ruling: a narrow holding on pre-K specifically would be managed; a broad ruling creating a general religious exemption from publicly funded programme conditions would reshape education policy in every state. Watch whether Justice Amy Coney Barrett writes the opinion — her authorship would signal a particular legal theory about institutional religious liberty that goes beyond this case. Watch Colorado’s legislative response: if the Court rules against the state, Colorado may restructure its programme to exclude religious schools entirely, which would be its constitutional right. And watch whether other states with universal pre-K programmes pre-emptively revise their anti-discrimination conditions, hoping to avoid similar litigation.
— J