The United Kingdom and European Union reached a draft agreement on Tuesday to eliminate much of the red tape that has burdened British food and agricultural exports since Brexit. The deal, described by officials as a “sanitary and phytosanitary” alignment arrangement, would reduce border checks and paperwork requirements on food exports — problems that have cost British exporters hundreds of millions of pounds in compliance costs since the 2021 Trade and Cooperation Agreement came into force. The agreement stops well short of the broader single market rejoining that Chancellor Rachel Reeves publicly advocated for just days earlier, when she said the UK’s future “should be inside the EU.” The deal comes as Prime Minister Andy Burnham navigates competing pressures: his parliamentary base increasingly wants deeper European integration, while polling consistently shows that the British electorate remains divided on the question and that the word “Brexit” still carries tribal valence that makes explicit reversal politically hazardous.
The received wisdom
The progressive-leaning consensus holds that Brexit was an act of collective national self-harm, that the economic evidence against it is now overwhelming, and that sensible governance requires walking back as much of it as expeditiously as possible. The Reeves comment — “the UK’s future should be inside the EU” — was widely praised in the European press and among British Remainers as an act of honest statecraft: a Chancellor finally saying what the data suggests. Reduced trade frictions, restored freedom of movement, regulatory alignment with Europe’s standards — these are, in this reading, simply rational policy choices that a serious government should pursue without apology. The food export deal, in this framing, is a welcome first step on a longer journey that logic and evidence demand.
A different read
The problem with the Reeves framing is not that it is irrational — as an economist’s statement, it is defensible. The problem is that it conflates policy preference with democratic legitimacy. The British electorate voted for Brexit in 2016 by 52 to 48 percent. That majority was built on concerns — about sovereignty, about immigration, about accountability — that were not simply invented by tabloids and demagogues. Many Brexit voters were wrong about specific claims, but they were responding to real grievances about a governance architecture that felt distant and unaccountable. A Chancellor who announces that the country’s future “should be inside the EU” without any fresh electoral mandate for that position is doing something constitutionally unusual, whatever its economic merits.
The food export deal itself represents something more interesting and more honest: the pragmatic management of an imperfect settlement. British exporters have lost real money to unnecessary bureaucracy, and reducing that friction is unambiguously good policy. It does not require relitigating the referendum; it requires recognising that some Brexit implementation choices were badly managed and can be improved within the existing TCA framework. This is different from rejoining. The distinction matters politically even if it doesn’t move macroeconomic indicators much.
There is a pattern in post-Brexit British governance that recurs across both Conservative and Labour periods: the temptation to keep reopening the fundamental question rather than optimising within the existing framework. The BBC’s political coverage has noted Burnham’s desire to “talk about Brexit again” — a desire that is understandable given the genuine economic costs but strategically complicated given that every time the question is relitigated, it energises Reform UK and fractures the Labour coalition between its metropolitan Remain base and its working-class Leave heartlands.
The more useful model is the Swiss or Norwegian one — neither of which is inside the EU, both of which have managed to maintain deep economic relationships with the bloc through a series of bilateral arrangements. Those arrangements are imperfect and require constant maintenance, but they demonstrate that the binary of “full EU membership” versus “economic isolation” is false. The food deal is evidence that the binary is false. That’s actually the most important thing about it.
Reeves’s candid ambition also raises a governance question: if the Labour government believes single market membership is the correct destination, shouldn’t it say so explicitly in a manifesto and seek a mandate? The alternative — incremental alignment without democratic authorisation — risks producing exactly the kind of technocratic overreach that made the EU so politically toxic in the first place.
What to watch
Watch whether the food deal triggers an EU demand for equivalence in other regulatory areas — SPS alignment often requires accepting the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction, which was one of Brexit’s original redlines. Watch Reform UK’s response: if they frame the deal as creeping reunification, Burnham will face awkward questions about where the line is drawn. Watch the Reeves “inside the EU” comment in the context of next week’s opinion polling — if it generates voter backlash, expect quiet distancing from Downing Street. And watch the trade balance data for agricultural goods in the quarters following implementation; if the numbers show genuine export improvement, the pragmatic case for further SPS alignment becomes harder to resist politically.
— J