Russia's war economy is beginning to crack

A new assessment from analysts monitoring the Ukraine conflict shows that Russia’s territorial gains have dwindled significantly in recent months, with its daily advance rate falling to fractions of what it achieved in 2024. Simultaneously, reports from commodity tracking firms indicate that Russian diesel exports are going unsold on the open market — a consequence of the expanded Western sanctions regime and the G7’s price cap mechanism, which has made it commercially difficult for non-Western buyers to process payments for Russian energy products. The combination of battlefield stagnation and fiscal pressure offers the first concrete evidence since the war’s beginning that the dual strategy of military support for Ukraine and economic attrition of Russia is producing compounding effects. The picture is not a collapse — Russia’s military is still fighting, still occupying large tracts of Ukrainian territory, and still projecting enough force to deter NATO escalation — but it is a measurably different picture from the one that existed twelve months ago.

The received wisdom

The standard progressive-internationalist framing on Ukraine has evolved over the course of the war in ways that are worth acknowledging. In 2022, the dominant view was that the war would end quickly — either in Russian victory or in a swift Ukrainian counter-offensive that restored the pre-2014 borders. When neither happened, the dominant view shifted to arguing that the conflict would become a frozen stalemate, that sanctions were ineffective, that Russia’s economy had proven more resilient than predicted, and that Western support for Ukraine was therefore futile or at least of diminishing marginal value. The human cost of prolongation, on this reading, mandated a negotiated settlement on terms that would leave Russia with significant territorial gains. That argument has been made across a spectrum from left-pacifists to realist academics, and it is not without analytical substance.

A different read

The problem with the “sanctions don’t work, negotiate now” consensus is that it made a judgment call on the evidence available at a particular moment and has been slow to revise that judgment as the evidence changed. The Russian economy did prove more resilient in 2022 and 2023 than Western analysts predicted — this is simply true, and the reasons for it (large forex reserves, Asian demand for energy, the difficulty of enforcing secondary sanctions) were real. But economic attrition is not a light switch. It is a slow-acting mechanism whose effects compound over time. The diesel surplus is a symptom of what has been building: Russia’s non-Western buyers — India, China, Turkey — have become more cautious about running Western sanctions risk as the US and EU have tightened secondary sanctions enforcement. China, in particular, has its own economic and financial exposure to Western markets that limits how far it is willing to go as a Russian lifeline.

The dwindling battlefield gains matter not just militarily but economically. Russia’s military is consuming ammunition, equipment, and personnel at rates that are difficult to sustain indefinitely. The labour drain into the armed forces has tightened the Russian domestic labour market and driven up wages, which, combined with defence spending that now exceeds 40% of the federal budget, is producing classic guns-vs-butter pressure. The Soviet Union’s analogous experience in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 is instructive: the USSR sustained that conflict for a decade, but the combination of military frustration and economic strain contributed, alongside many other factors, to the systemic weakening that preceded its collapse. No competent analyst argues that Russia in 2026 is on the verge of collapse — it is not. But the historical evidence suggests that states whose military adventures fail to achieve their objectives within a reasonable timeframe, while simultaneously generating fiscal strain, tend to face choices that democratic publics constrain and authoritarian ones do not.

The right-of-centre argument here is also, bluntly, that the West needs to maintain the strategic patience to see this through. The fatigue argument — that Western publics cannot sustain support for Ukraine indefinitely — is partly self-fulfilling. Political leaders who communicate clearly about why the war matters (European security architecture, the precedent of territorial conquest by force, the specific interests of NATO’s eastern members) can maintain public support. Leaders who treat Ukraine as an indefinite drain to be managed rather than a strategic investment tend to create the fatigue they predict. The newly Democratic US Congress will face a direct test of this: whether it continues military and financial assistance to Ukraine or uses budget leverage to compel a negotiated settlement on Russia’s terms.

Historically, the economic turn in the Russo-Ukrainian war also raises questions about the shape of any eventual settlement. A Russia that is militarily stagnant and economically stressed is more likely to negotiate, but also more likely to negotiate in bad faith — accepting a ceasefire while preserving the capacity to resume hostilities once it has reconstituted its forces. The 2015 Minsk agreements provide a cautionary precedent: ceasefire lines that froze a Russian advantage in place while Russia rearmed for the 2022 invasion. Any future settlement framework needs verification mechanisms robust enough to avoid a repetition.

What to watch

  • G7 enforcement of the price cap: whether secondary sanctions on Chinese and Indian buyers of Russian oil and diesel are actually applied, or remain a threat.
  • Russian central bank interest rates, currently extremely elevated — a sign of inflationary pressure — and whether any reduction signals that the fiscal situation is easing or deteriorating.
  • US Democratic Congress and the Ukraine supplemental aid package due in early 2027: vote margins and conditions attached.
  • Ukraine’s own economic situation: IMF projections, reconstruction costs, and the European Commission’s commitment to pre-accession support, all of which determine how long Kyiv can sustain the war effort domestically.

— J