The ANC's slow-motion reckoning in South Africa

The African National Congress is on course for its worst local government election result in the post-apartheid era, with results showing the party below 40% nationally with 80% of ballots counted. The elections, held this week across South Africa’s municipalities, have seen the ANC lose ground in its traditional strongholds, including parts of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, as voters delivered a verdict on decades of unreliable electricity supply, water outages, failing sanitation infrastructure, and a national unemployment rate that exceeds 33%. The Democratic Alliance made gains in several urban metros, while the Economic Freedom Fighters and smaller parties consolidated protest votes in rural areas. The result will require the ANC to negotiate coalition arrangements in a larger number of municipalities than at any point since Nelson Mandela’s government, challenging the party’s long-held assumption that it can govern alone at every level.

The received wisdom

The centre-left framing of South Africa’s crisis is structural and historically rooted, and it contains genuine truth. The ANC inherited a country shaped by decades of apartheid-era disinvestment in black communities — crumbling infrastructure, Bantustan-era underdevelopment, a skills gap that took a generation to begin to close. The electricity crisis, on this reading, is partly a consequence of the apartheid government’s deliberate choice not to extend the grid to black townships. The unemployment crisis reflects an economy whose capital and managerial class remained overwhelmingly white for years after 1994, limiting the speed at which black South Africans could access the labour market on equal terms. The ANC’s governance failures, critics on the left argue, must be understood against this structural backdrop rather than judged by the standards of a developed economy that started from a different baseline. Furthermore, the DA — the principal beneficiary of ANC decline in urban areas — has a historical association with the old National Party’s voter base that makes many South Africans reluctant to see it as a genuine national alternative.

A different read

The structural argument is not wrong. But it has been deployed for thirty years as a reason not to examine the ANC’s specific governance choices, and at some point the statute of limitations on blaming apartheid for the absence of reliable running water in a 2026 municipality has to expire. The electricity crisis at Eskom, the state power utility, is not primarily a legacy problem. It is the product of decisions made in the 2000s and 2010s: the ANC government’s resistance to private power generation as a matter of ideological principle, the appointment of politically connected cadres to Eskom’s management, the contract irregularities surrounding the Medupi and Kusile power stations that produced generating capacity years late and billions of rand over budget, and the systematic looting of state resources documented in the Zondo Commission’s multi-thousand-page report on state capture.

The right-of-centre analysis of the ANC’s decline has to be honest about what has happened, which is not merely governance failure in the neutral sense but something closer to the phenomenon Friedrich Hayek described: a liberation movement that, having achieved power, could not distinguish between the party’s institutional interests and the public good. “Cadre deployment” — the ANC’s formal policy of filling state institutions with party loyalists — was designed explicitly to ensure that the state served the party rather than the other way around. The result has been not just corruption but the systematic degradation of institutional capacity: municipalities that can no longer maintain water treatment plants, provinces that cannot process social grant applications, police services too under-resourced to address the world-leading violent crime rate that blights South African life.

The historical parallel is instructive and uncomfortable. The ANC in 2026 bears more resemblance to the Indian National Congress in the late Nehru era than to the governing parties of Singapore or Botswana that African nationalists sometimes invoke. The Congress’s long dominance produced, by the 1970s, a party so identified with the state that it literally could not imagine the state being run by anyone else — a condition Indira Gandhi exploited toward authoritarian ends. South Africa has not gone that route — its judiciary, civil society, and independent media are considerably more robust than India’s were under the Emergency — but the structural dynamic of a hegemonic liberation movement unable to reform itself is recognisable. The question is whether the ANC’s coalition arithmetic in local government will finally force the institutional learning that three decades of unchallenged power did not.

The economic implications extend well beyond South Africa’s borders. South Africa is the most industrialised economy in sub-Saharan Africa and a critical node in regional supply chains. Its electricity shortages have already cost the economy an estimated R1 trillion in lost output over the last decade. For investors watching whether Africa’s most developed market can stabilise, these local elections are a leading indicator.

What to watch

  • Coalition negotiations in Johannesburg, Tshwane, and eThekwini: whether the ANC accepts DA-led coalitions or gravitates toward EFF arrangements that would accelerate economic populism.
  • The ANC’s internal response — whether President Ramaphosa can use the result to accelerate reforms or whether it triggers a factional leadership challenge.
  • Progress on private power procurement: Independent Power Producers have contracts signed, but grid connection remains a bottleneck controlled by Eskom.
  • Whether the ANC’s national vote share in the 2028 general election crosses the psychological threshold below 40%, which would make outright national government dependent on coalition for the first time.

— J