Five years of Taliban rule's education catastrophe

Saturday marks five years since the Taliban re-entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, completing their takeover of Afghanistan as the last American forces withdrew. The intervening half-decade has been defined, above all else, by a deliberate and systematic assault on education. Girls have been barred from secondary school since September 2021 and from universities since December 2022 — a ban that now affects an estimated 1.4 million adolescent girls and has virtually eliminated female participation in higher education. Afghan women interviewed by the BBC this week described lives that are “unrecognisable” — confined to the home, stripped of the professional licences they earned, and subject to a system of male guardianship that echoes the Taliban’s first period of rule in the 1990s. NPR reporting notes that boys’ education, while not formally banned, has also suffered as qualified female teachers have been expelled from the profession and school quality has collapsed.

The received wisdom

The mainstream humanitarian framing is straightforward and, in its essentials, correct: this is a human rights catastrophe. The international community — the UN, foreign governments, international NGOs — has consistently condemned the Taliban’s education bans. The argument runs that Afghanistan’s girls are being robbed of their futures by a theocratic government that has used a selective and politically convenient reading of Islamic jurisprudence to entrench patriarchal control. The proper response is continued sanctions pressure, funding for underground schooling networks, diplomatic isolation of the Taliban regime, and steadfast refusal to grant it the recognition it seeks.

The progressive variant of this argument adds a post-colonial layer: Western governments bear particular responsibility for the chaos that followed the 2001 intervention, and their abandonment of Afghan women in the 2021 withdrawal represents a moral debt that must be repaid through sustained engagement and advocacy. That the Afghan state built over 20 years of Western presence ultimately collapsed in eleven days is, on this reading, primarily a Western failure of will and planning.

These views have significant merit. They should not be dismissed.

A different read

But the received wisdom also papers over a number of harder questions — questions that the fifth anniversary makes unavoidable.

The first is about what the twenty-year Western mission actually built. The collapse of the Afghan National Army — which evaporated within days of the US withdrawal despite receiving an estimated $88 billion in US training and equipment — was not primarily a failure of resources. It was a failure of institution-building at the most basic level: the creation of a military, a bureaucracy, and a civil society that had genuine roots in Afghan society rather than in Western contract-management processes. A school built by a USAID contractor and staffed by teachers trained in Kabul was not the same thing as a community that had internalised the value of girls’ literacy. The Taliban’s ability to simply shut it all down in a matter of months reflects, in part, how thin the institutional layer was.

This is not to excuse the Taliban. Their education ban is monstrous by any standard — Islamic scholarly tradition, incidentally, has no consensus endorsement of it, and several significant ulema have privately and publicly criticised it. The point is rather that Western liberal institutions, for twenty years, prioritised metrics — school enrollment figures, literacy rates, maternal health statistics — that could be reported to donor governments, over the slower, less legible work of changing what communities actually believe. The result was a Potemkin modernity that the Taliban swept away without difficulty.

The second hard question is about the international community’s leverage now. Sanctions and diplomatic isolation have been in place for five years. The Taliban have not moved. They are, in some respects, more entrenched than they were in 2021: they control more territory, they have suppressed domestic opposition, and they have built rudimentary economic relationships with China, Russia, Pakistan, and Gulf states that partially offset Western financial pressure. The countries that could most plausibly influence Taliban behaviour — Pakistan, China, the Gulf monarchies — have no particular incentive to push on women’s education because it does not serve their immediate interests.

There is an uncomfortable parallel with Iran’s theocratic state in the 1980s and 1990s: Western sanctions and isolation preserved the clerical regime’s ability to blame foreign enemies for domestic hardship, while doing little to alter the regime’s internal calculations. What finally changed Iranian society — partially, gradually — was the rise of an urban middle class and the spread of information technology, not international pressure campaigns. Afghanistan’s economic collapse under Taliban misrule may, paradoxically, be creating conditions for long-run delegitimisation of the regime — but that is a cold comfort to a generation of girls who will never attend university.

The right response to the fifth anniversary is not despair, but clear-eyed honesty. Continue the aid pipelines that reach Afghan women and girls directly. Refuse to grant the Taliban the diplomatic recognition they want. Fund the underground schools, the distance-learning programmes, the Afghan diaspora educational networks. But drop the pretence that the policy toolkit deployed since 2021 is working at the pace the crisis demands.

What to watch

  • UN Special Rapporteur report due September: The formal assessment of Taliban compliance with prior commitments will either maintain pressure or quietly soften — watch which direction it cuts.
  • China-Taliban economic agreements: If Beijing deepens its Belt and Road engagement with Afghanistan, Western leverage through financial isolation shrinks further.
  • Taliban internal divisions: There are reported disagreements between the Kandahar-based supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and the Kabul political team — any visible fracture could create space for limited reform.
  • Pakistani political pressure: Islamabad’s deteriorating relationship with the Taliban over border violence may be the most significant near-term lever for external pressure on Kabul.

— J