The United States has accused dozens of countries of helping China circumvent President Trump’s tariff regime by serving as transshipment hubs — receiving Chinese goods, minimally processing them, and re-exporting them to the American market at lower tariff rates, according to reporting by the BBC. The US Trade Representative’s office identified the practice as a significant and growing problem, with Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Mexico among the countries reportedly involved. The tariff structure Trump imposed — which included levies as high as 145 percent on Chinese goods at various points — created, almost by mathematical necessity, an enormous arbitrage opportunity: any country whose tariff rate was substantially below China’s could profit by becoming a waystation for Chinese products. The US accusation signals that the administration is contemplating secondary tariffs on transshipping nations, a step that would significantly escalate the global trade confrontation.
The received wisdom
Free-trade internationalists will frame this as confirmation that unilateral tariff regimes are self-defeating. The logic runs: if you impose punitive tariffs on one country without coordinating with your allies, trade simply reroutes through third parties. American consumers pay higher prices, Chinese manufacturers adapt their supply chains, and the net effect on Chinese industrial capacity is limited while the diplomatic cost — alienating Vietnam, Malaysia, and Mexico, countries the US has been at pains to court as alternatives to Chinese supply chains — is considerable. The correct approach, on this view, is multilateral: working through the WTO dispute-resolution mechanism, coordinating with European and Asian allies, and building a genuinely unified front rather than a unilateral American fortress.
This is a reasonable critique in pure economic theory terms. Supply chains are fungible; tariffs at one node create pressure that finds release at others.
A different read
But the free-trade critique, while analytically sound, suffers from a basic practical problem: the WTO mechanism the mainstream recommends has been essentially non-functional for the purposes the US needs it to serve.
The WTO’s Appellate Body — the body that adjudicates trade disputes — has been in various states of dysfunction since the US began blocking new judge appointments in 2017, under the Obama administration’s final year, a process that the Trump administration subsequently accelerated. Even when functioning, WTO dispute resolution takes years, and the remedies it provides (authorisation to impose retaliatory tariffs) are blunt instruments poorly suited to the specific problem of Chinese state-directed industrial overcapacity. The European Union, which has pursued its own anti-dumping investigations against Chinese steel and electric vehicles, has effectively reached the same conclusion through a different route: the existing multilateral machinery is inadequate to the scale and speed of China’s subsidised export surge.
The transshipment problem reveals a genuine structural tension in the current global trading order. Countries like Vietnam have, rationally, built export industries that partially process Chinese intermediate goods and sell them as “Made in Vietnam” products. This serves Vietnam’s economic development goals; it is not simply cynical cheating. The BBC’s reporting notes that US officials acknowledge the line between genuine value-added manufacturing and tariff evasion is genuinely difficult to draw in many product categories. Extending tariffs to third countries will create its own second-order problems: Vietnam is a critical node in semiconductor and electronics supply chain diversification away from China, and penalising it creates costs that fall ultimately on American technology companies.
There is a historical parallel worth examining. In the 1980s, Japan-US trade tensions produced a series of “voluntary export restraints” (VERs) under which Japanese automakers agreed to cap their exports to the American market. The result was partly what American negotiators intended — Japanese car sales in the US declined — but also partly what they did not intend: Japanese manufacturers built American factories, raised prices on the cars they did export (capturing most of the “tariff equivalent” as profit), and accelerated their move upmarket. The VERs changed behaviour at the margin without resolving the underlying competitive dynamic.
China’s response to US tariffs has been similar in structure if not in detail: an aggressive push to establish manufacturing in third countries, accelerate its own technological development, and develop alternative markets in the Global South. The transshipment problem is a symptom of that adaptation. Extending secondary tariffs to countries like Vietnam may produce a short-term reduction in transshipment but will also produce a new round of Chinese supply-chain adaptation — and will exact a significant diplomatic price in a region where American credibility as a reliable economic partner is already strained.
The right frame for evaluating Trump’s tariff strategy is not whether it has eliminated Chinese competitive pressure on American industry — it has not. It is whether the combination of tariffs, export controls on semiconductors and advanced manufacturing equipment, and investment in domestic production is cumulatively making a structural difference to America’s technological and industrial position. The evidence on that question is genuinely mixed, and the honest assessment is that the administration has not yet demonstrated a coherent theory of how tariff pressure translates into durable American industrial advantage.
What to watch
- Secondary tariff announcements: Whether and how quickly the USTR moves to impose tariffs on Vietnam, Malaysia, or Mexico will signal whether this is a negotiating posture or a genuine enforcement escalation.
- WTO filing activity: A renewed push by China or affected third countries to file formal WTO complaints would crystallise the legal dimension.
- Semiconductor supply chain impact: Any secondary tariffs that catch Vietnamese electronics manufacturers in their scope would produce immediate reactions from Apple, Intel, and Nvidia — companies that have loudly supported supply-chain diversification.
- US-Vietnam bilateral trade talks: The State Department’s ability to offer Vietnam an alternative framework — one that rewards genuine manufacturing investment while targeting pure transshipment — will be the test of whether the administration has a strategy beyond confrontation.
— J